Introduction
Policy in Malaysia is designed generally upon the requirement of the political and social structure and the future demand of the nations as a whole. Since Malaysian community is a multi-ethnic society; therefore, any public policy formulation has to be carefully studied by taking into consideration many factors such as political, social and economic factors to give an acceptable norm of satisfaction among its citizen. Therefore, this term paper will briefly explain the influence of all these factors that eventually set up the current education policy in Malaysia.
Malaysian Political System
In order to understand the public policy in Malaysia; therefore, it is essential to get a clear scenario on the country’s political system and its social structures. Malaysian political system is based on Parliamentary Democracy and is ruled as a Constitutional Monarchy with his Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) as the Supreme Head of the country. Malaysia upholds federal constitution that divides authority into legislative, judicial and executive authorities. The doctrine of separation of power, check and balance are clearly stated in the Federal Constitution. Concept of federalism also becomes a basis for Government Administration between the state and the federal government. Such system is so effective to coordinate the public policy formulation and implementation processes with the assistance of the government machinery. Since independence (31 August 1957), National Front Party (Barisan Nasional), which composed of United Malay National Organization, Malaysian Chinese Association, Malaysian Indian Congress and other affiliation parties, has become the only ruling party in the country and three major races represent it: the Malay, the Chinese and the Indian. Malaysia’s total population is estimated at 20.56 million (1996). Three major races in Malaysia are the Bumiputras (sons of the soils) including Malay (59% or 12.13 million), the Chinese (26% or 5.34 million) and the Indian (8% or 1.52 million). The structure of the society has definitely influenced the development of the current Malaysian Education System through various series of events in reforming the education policy just to suit the current and the future demands of the nation.
Important Features of Policy Process
In Malaysia, the social and political systems are very closely related in formulating public policy. The establishment of public policy is complex due to involvement various interested parties during the process to derive to a decision. Public Policy in Malaysia can be created through one or combination of three processes. First is through political channel that means the policy is initiated through Cabinet orders or through the recommendation of several political reigning parties. Second is through administrative processes at the ministerial level. Since a policy has implication on the administrative machinery, the drafted policy is discussed at several high-level of government meetings. Third is through the combination of both processes via integrated interaction. Special Committees may be set up to study in-depth the policy before presenting it to the Cabinet. Hence, we can see in this paper that public policy in Malaysia such as Education Policy will always be revised from time to time adjusting itself to the contemporary requirement by applying these three processes.
In general, policy making process in Malaysia has to go through several stages such as identifying the arising problems, recommending suitable alternatives, implementing the suitable action policy, coordinating various events to suit the established policy and finally evaluating the effectiveness of such policy. Upon all processes, policy revision is vital nowadays due to the development of complex society in the modern era. Besides the policy process making, the roles played by certain groups are essential to provide a better input in the content of the policy. Generally three categories are identified: the politicians and government public administrators; the publics; and the related interest group. The first group is the major players to be responsible in ensuring the success of the policy implementation. This group can be refined as the Cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and high-level of government officials. The policy is implemented under the jurisdiction of the Constitution and government regulations. Under the Constitution, the federal, state and local governments are given constitutional rights to implement public policy. As for the publics, they can act individually or form interest groups to put forth their ideas and needs for government consideration. However, these individuals and interest groups do not automatically have the exact power to formulate a public policy or playing as a major actor. Still, their movement can sometimes get a kind of strong public support through their campaign and activities and they also can make the policymaker to understand a ground problem in a clear vision to resolve the arising problems. Now let us relate Malaysian education policy in a clear sense of its policy processes and implementations before and after independence.
Evolution of Malaysian Education Policy
During the British Colonialism, the government at that time identified a need to establish a systematic school system that would create a quality education for all races in the country. However it was made in the sense of satisfying the British interest not to the nation as a whole. In 1950, Barnes Committee headed by L.J.Barnes (Oxford University) was established to make a study upon meeting such requirement. Barnes Report was available in 1951 that highlighted the following recommendation. All Malay and English school would be preserved and should be given priority. Vernacular school would be closed and replaced by the National School. English would be the medium of instruction at the secondary level. Free education was guaranteed at the National School. The Chinese and the Indian felt dissatisfaction about such recommendation and voiced out that their system of education should also be emphasized. Fenn-Wuu Committee was then established to revise the education problem for the Chinese community. The committee recommended that the Malay, Chinese and Indian languages should simultaneously be a medium of instruction in the school system and therefore all schoolbooks should apply those languages. However, the government objected such proposal. In this case, the British administration had shown strong enforcement to implement its own education policy according to their interest not according to the nation’s interest.
At the end of British colonialism era, the society, especially from several group of educated Malay made a movement to revamp the colonial education system. The essence of having a new national education policy was to make it more representative to the nation. Such movement had made the education issue to be prioritized in the aspect of nation building. Hence, the government agreed to set up a special committee led by Tun Abdul Razak (first Minister of Education and the second Prime Minister of Malaysia) to make several recommendations. This committee composed of high level of government officials and education experts from various groups (local and foreign). This comprehensive recommendation was known as Razak’s Report 1956. The objective of this committee was to establish a national education system that would promote the cultural, social, economic and political development accepted by the nation as a whole, having regard that the Malay language would be the national language. Hence, Malay language should be the main medium of instruction in the education system. The content of the Razak’s Report was later became the basis feature to establish the Education Ordinance 1957. Furthermore, the Malaysian Government at that time started to make several evolutionary changes especially upon educational curriculum to suit the aspiration of the Malaysian outlook. Education Policy should reflect to the satisfaction of all society in Malaysia and this had become a part of the political agenda for the ruling party.
To speed up the process of national integration and unity, the Rahman Talib’s Report was made by new special committee to review the education policy in 1960 and became a basis to establish the Education Act 1961. The act provided the legal basis for enabling national language to be a compulsory subject in primary and secondary school and in all training institutions. The act required pupils to have a satisfied grade in national language subject to be awarded a certificate for public education examination especially at the end of the lower and upper secondary levels. All School using English as the medium of instruction were gradually adopting National language. Since national language is Malay and had already accepted by the Chinese, Indian and other races; therefore, such enforcement will enable the society as a whole to shape up the language proficiency in the Malay language.
In 1979, a report from the Special Cabinet Committee chaired by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (Mahathir’s Report), who was the Minister of Education at that time (later become a Prime Minister since 1981), was finalized after a six-year study. The objectives were to achieve national unity in a multiethnic society besides increase the sense of patriotism, to produce skilled manpower for national development and to further extend the policy of democratization of education in order to strike a balance in all aspects of education between rural and urban areas. This report has become a guideline for reforming the education system in the recent years. In 1995 and 1996, the Education Act was amended to give sufficient need to meet the challenges in the 21st century beside making Malaysia as a center of excellence to the world. The national education philosophy indicates that it is essential to develop potential individuals who are responsible and capable of achieving high level of personal well-being as well as being able to contribute to the harmony and betterment of the family, the society and the nation at large. Pre-school education has become one of the important components of the formal education system after the Education Act in 1996 enacted. It guarantees access of pre-school education to children between the age of five and six in urban and rural area. This will guarantee that the rural society will get the same opportunity to develop their social status by having quality education. The New Primary and Secondary Education Curriculums have been introduced to focus on developing skilled and knowledge manpower for the nation.
From the brief explanation above, we can analyze that the education policy in Malaysia is always being changed from time to time in order to meet the current and the future demands. We also can observe that such policy will be effectively implemented through collaboration among races and also through enforcing it by legal binding.
Examplification of Policy Process Related to Education Reform
In brief, Public Policy in Malaysia can be created through legal action, planning, program and project. The implementation of education policy combines most of the factors mentioned above. Education Policy was initiated structurally through a set up of special committee that proposed several recommendations. Minister and Public Administrators in the Ministry of Education were held responsible to overview such recommendations. Several inputs were given by a group of experts (interest group) especially from the National Union of the Teacher Profession (NUTP) to strengthen the policy content. Finally, the proposed policy that portrayed a set of guidelines was put forth for the Cabinet approval and the Cabinet composed of Ministers that represent the affiliation political parties in the National Front Party. Therefore once decision is derived, it would be considered as representative to the nation at large. To enforce it, a set of regulations was introduced. Education Policy was then strengthened by the enforcement of Education Act.
To simplify, the Education Act 1996 was prepared in conjunction to the guideline set in the Education Policy. Public Administrators in the Ministry of Education were responsible to gather related materials to compose the drafted bill in two versions: Malay and English with the assistance from the expertise of the Attorney’s General Office before presenting it to the Cabinet. After having such draft, a memorandum (recommendation paper) was prepared to justify the concerned education bill and was sent to the related ministries and central agency such as Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning Unit, Implementation and Coordination Units, Attorney’s General Office; etc to get an advisory comment. The feedback is important to guide the Cabinet before making a decision. This Bill was prepared before the Parliament session begins, usually in one month before the session started. The Bill indicated certain parts of the existing law to be amended, if it involved amendments. After information was gathered, the Minister of Education gave approval to forward the memorandum and the drafted bill at the Cabinet weekly meeting (Wednesday) after getting the clearance from the Cabinet Secretariat. This secretariat is under the Cabinet, Constitution and Inter Government Relation Division, Prime Minister Department headed by the Chief Secretary to the Government who is also the Head of the Government Civil Service. When Cabinet approved the bill, the decision was conveyed to the Ministry and the Ministries concerned. The Ministry of Education proceeded to obtain a notice of Presentation on the Bill to the House of Representative and the Senate Office for debate and approval in both houses during the Parliament Session. The bill was passed by both houses (more 2/3 vote) and was submitted to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for the Royal Assent. The bill became law after gazetted. Finally, the decision was conveyed administratively to related parties and through several high-level of government meetings such as Meeting of the State Chief Minister; Meeting of Secretary-Generals of Ministries and Heads Of Services; Meeting of Heads of Federal Departments; Meeting of Chief Executives of Federal Statutory Bodies; and Meeting of Liaison Committee Between Federal and State Government.
Conclusion
Education reformation between countries may be different due to the characteristics of the nation, political and socio-economic establishment within one state. Hence, any kind of proposals on reforming education system in Malaysia has to be justifiable within the scope of the main vision of the country; in another word, the national policy. One way to collaborate is to proceed along the line with the vision of the country that has already been accepted by the whole nation and through structurally effective government machinery that has main players (the actors) to formulate and implement the policy effectively and efficiently.
Azman Mohd. Yusof
Policy Science
Graduate School of Policy Science, Saitama University
25 February 1998
Sunday, October 30, 2011
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
道德经 Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching)
Tao Te Ching
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
道德经 Dàodéjīng
The Tao Te Ching, Dao De Jing, or Daodejing (道德經), also simply referred to as Laozi,[1] whose authorship has been attributed to Laozi,[2] is a Chinese classic text. Its name comes from the opening words of its two sections: 道 dào "way," Chapter 1, and 德 dé "virtue/power," Chapter 38, plus 經 jīng "classic." According to tradition, it was written around the 6th century BC by the sage Laozi (or Lao Tzu, "Old Master"), a record-keeper at the Zhou Dynasty court, by whose name the text is known in China. The text's true authorship and date of composition or compilation are still debated,[3] although the oldest excavated text dates back to the late 4th century BC.[1]
The text is fundamental to the Philosophical Taoism (Daojia (Pinyin: Dàojiā) 道家) and strongly influenced other schools, such as Legalism and Neo-Confucianism. This ancient book is also central in Chinese religion, not only for Religious Daoism (Daojiao (Pinyin: Dàojiào) 道教) but Chinese Buddhism, which when first introduced into China was largely interpreted through the use of Daoist words and concepts. Many Chinese artists, including poets, painters, calligraphers, and even gardeners have used the Daodejing as a source of inspiration. Its influence has also spread widely outside East Asia, and is amongst the most translated works in world literature.[1]
The Wade–Giles romanization "Tao Te Ching" dates back to early English transliterations in the late 19th century, and many people continue using it, especially for words and phrases that have become well-established in English. The pinyin romanization "Daodejing" originated in the late 20th century, and this romanization is becoming increasingly popular, having been adopted as the official system by the Chinese government.
Contents
[hide] 1 The text 1.1 Title
1.2 Internal structure
1.3 Historical authenticity of the author
1.4 Principal versions
1.5 Mawangdui and Guodian texts
1.6 Written style
2 Interpretation and themes 2.1 Ineffability or Genesis
2.2 The Mysterious Female
2.3 Returning (Union with the Primordial)
2.4 Emptiness
2.5 Knowledge and humility
2.6 Interpretations in relation to religious traditions
3 Translations 3.1 Translational difficulties
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References
7 External links 7.1 Online English translations
[edit] The text
The Daodejing has a long and complex textual history. On one hand, there are transmitted versions and commentaries that date back two millennia; on the other, there are ancient bamboo, silk, and paper manuscripts that archeologists discovered in the last century.
[edit] Title
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"Tao Te Ching", Calligraphy by Gia-Fu Feng
There are many possible translations of the book's title:
Dào/Tao 道 literally means "way", or one of its synonyms, but was extended to mean "the Way." This term, which was variously used by other Chinese philosophers (including Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, and Hanfeizi), has special meaning within the context of Daoism, where it implies the essential, unnamable process of the universe.
Dé/Te 德 basically means "virtue" in the sense of "personal character," "inner strength" (virtuosity), or "integrity." The semantics of this Chinese word resemble English virtue, which developed from a (now archaic) sense of "inner potency" or "divine power" (as in "healing virtue of a drug") to the modern meaning of "moral excellence" or "goodness." Compare the compound word dàodé (道德 "ethics," "ethical principles," "morals," or "morality").
Jīng/Ching 經 as it is used here means "canon," "great book," or "classic."
Thus, Daodejing can be translated as "The Classic/Canon of the Way/Path and the Power/Virtue," etc.
The title Daodejing is an honorific given by posterity, other titles include the amalgam Lǎozǐ Dàodéjīng (老子道德經), the honorific Daode Zhen Jing (道德真經 "True Classic of the Way and the Power"), and the Wuqian wen (五千文 "Five thousand character [classic]").
[edit] Internal structure
The received Tao Te Ching is a short text of around 5,000 Chinese characters in 81 brief chapters or sections (章). There is some evidence that the chapter divisions were later additions - for commentary, or as aids to rote memorization - and that the original text was more fluidly organized. It has two parts, the Tao Ching (道經; chaps. 1–37) and the Te Ching (德經; chaps. 38–81), which may have been edited together into the received text, possibly reversed from an original "Te Tao Ching". The written style is laconic, has few grammatical particles, and encourages varied, even contradictory interpretations. The ideas are singular; the style poetic.
The Chinese characters in the original versions were probably written in zhuànshū (篆書 seal script), while later versions were written in lìshū (隷書 clerical script) and kǎishū (楷書 regular script) styles. Daoist Chinese Characters contains a good summary of these different calligraphies.
[edit] Historical authenticity of the author
The Tao Te Ching is ascribed to Laozi, whose historical existence has been a matter of scholastic debate. His name, which means "Old Master", has only fueled controversy on this issue. (Kaltenmark 1969:10).
Laozi
The first reliable reference to Laozi is his "biography" in Shiji (63, tr. Chan 1963:35-37), by Chinese historian Sima Qian (ca. 145–86 BC), which combines three stories. First, Laozi was a contemporary of Confucius (551-479 BC). His surname was Li (李 "plum"), and his personal name was Er (耳 "ear") or Dan (聃 "long ear"). He was an official in the imperial archives, and wrote a book in two parts before departing to the West. Second, Laozi was Lao Laizi (老來子 "Old Come Master"), also a contemporary of Confucius, who wrote a book in 15 parts. Third, Laozi was the Grand Historian and astrologer Lao Dan (老聃 "Old Long-ears"), who lived during the reign (384-362 BC) of Duke Xian (獻公) of Qin).
Generations of scholars have debated the historicity of Laozi and the dating of the Tao Te Ching. Linguistic studies of the text's vocabulary and rhyme scheme point to a date of composition after the Shi Jing yet before the Zhuangzi. Legends claim variously that Laozi was "born old"; that he lived for 996 years, with twelve previous incarnations starting around the time of the Three Sovereigns before the thirteenth as Laozi. Some Western scholars have expressed doubts over Laozi's historical existence, claiming that the Tao Te Ching is actually a collection of the work of various authors.
Many Taoists venerate Laozi as Daotsu the founder of the school of Dao, the Daode Tianjun in the Three Pure Ones, one of the eight elders transformed from Taiji in the Chinese creation myth.
[edit] Principal versions
Among the many transmitted editions of the Tao Te Ching text, the three primary ones are named after early commentaries. The "Yan Zun Version," which is only extant for the Te Ching, derives from a commentary attributed to Han Dynasty scholar Yan Zun (巖尊, fl. 80 BC-10 AD). The "Heshang Gong Version" is named after the legendary Heshang Gong (河上公 "Riverside Sage") who supposedly lived during the reign (202-157 BC) of Emperor Wen of Han. This commentary (tr. Erkes 1950) has a preface written by Ge Xuan (葛玄, 164-244 AD), granduncle of Ge Hong, and scholarship dates this version to around the 3rd century AD. The "Wang Bi Version" has more verifiable origins than either of the above. Wang Bi (王弼, 226 – 249 AD) was a famous Three Kingdoms period philosopher and commentator on the Tao Te Ching (tr. Lin 1977, Rump and Chan 1979) and the I Ching.
Tao Te Ching scholarship has lately advanced from archeological discoveries of manuscripts, some of which are older than any of the received texts. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, Marc Aurel Stein and others found thousands of scrolls in the Mogao Caves near Dunhuang. They included more than 50 partial and complete "Tao Te Ching" manuscripts. One written by the scribe So/Su Dan (素統) is dated 270 AD and corresponds closely with the Heshang Gong version. Another partial manuscript has the Xiang'er (想爾) commentary, which had previously been lost.
[edit] Mawangdui and Guodian texts
In 1973, archeologists discovered copies of early Chinese books, known as the Mawangdui Silk Texts, in a tomb dating from 168 BC.[1] They included two nearly complete copies of the text, referred to as Text A (甲) and Text B (乙), both of which reverse the traditional ordering and put the Te Ching section before the Tao Ching, which is why the Henricks translation of them is named "Te-Tao Ching". Based on calligraphic styles and imperial naming taboo avoidances, scholars believe that A can be dated to about the first decade and B to about the third decade of the 2nd century BC.[4]
In 1993, the oldest known version of the text, written on bamboo tablets, was found in a tomb near the town of Guodian (郭店) in Jingmen, Hubei, and dated prior to 300 BC.[1] The Guodian Chu Slips comprise about 800 slips of bamboo with a total of over 13,000 characters, about 2,000 of which correspond with the Tao Te Ching, including 14 previously unknown verses.
Both the Mawangdui and Guodian versions are generally consistent with the received texts, excepting differences in chapter sequence and graphic variants. Several recent Tao Te Ching translations (e.g., Lau 1989, Henricks 1989, Mair 1990, Henricks 2000, Allan and Williams 2000, and Roberts 2004) utilize these two versions, sometimes with the verses reordered to synthesize the new finds.
[edit] Written style
The Tao Te Ching was originally written in zhuànshū calligraphy style. It is difficult to obtain modern replicas of these styles except through specialty stores. Most modern versions use the newspaper print style kǎishū.
[edit] Interpretation and themes
The passages are ambiguous, and topics range from political advice for rulers to practical wisdom for people. Because the variety of interpretation is virtually limitless, not only for different people but for the same person over time, readers do well to avoid making claims of objectivity or superiority. Also, since the book is 81 short poems, there is little need for an abridgement.
[edit] Ineffability or Genesis
The Way that can be told of is not an unvarying way; The names that can be named are not unvarying names. It was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang; The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures, each after its kind. (chap. 1, tr. Waley)
These famous first lines of the Tao Te Ching state that the Tao is ineffable, i.e., the Tao is nameless, goes beyond distinctions, and transcends language. However this first verse does not occur in the earliest known version from the Guodian Chu Slips and there is speculation that it may have been added by later commentators.[5] In Laozi's Qingjing Jing (verse 1-8) he clarified the term Tao was nominated as he was trying to describe a state of existence before it happened and before time or space. Way or path happened to be the side meaning of Tao, ineffability would be just poetic. This is the Chinese creation myth from the primordial Tao.
[edit] The Mysterious Female
The Valley Spirit never dies It is named the Mysterious Female. And the doorway of the Mysterious Female Is the base from which Heaven and Earth sprang. It is there within us all the while; Draw upon it as you will, it never runs dry. (chap. 6, tr. Waley)
Like the above description of the ineffable Tao as "the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures", the Tao Te Ching advocates "female" (or Yin) values, emphasizing the passive, solid, and quiescent qualities of nature (which is opposed to the active and energetic), and "having without possessing". Waley's translation can also be understood as the Esoteric Feminine in that it can be known intuitively, that must be complemented by the masculine, "male" (or Yang), again amplified in Qingjing Jing (verse 9-13). Yin and Yang should be balanced, "Know masculinity, Maintain femininity, and be a ravine for all under heaven." (chap. 28, tr. Mair)
[edit] Returning (Union with the Primordial)
In Tao the only motion is returning; The only useful quality, weakness. For though all creatures under heaven are the products of Being, Being itself is the product of Not-being. " (chap. 40, tr. Waley)
Another theme is the eternal return, or what Mair (1990:139) calls "the continual return of the myriad creatures to the cosmic principle from which they arose."
There is a contrast between the rigidity of death and the weakness of life: "When he is born, man is soft and weak; in death he becomes stiff and hard. The ten thousand creatures and all plants and trees while they are alive are supple and soft, but when dead they become brittle and dry." (chap. 76, tr. Waley). This is returning to the beginning of things, or to one's own childhood.
The Tao Te Ching focuses upon the beginnings of society, and describes a golden age in the past, comparable with the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Human problems arose from the "invention" of culture and civilization. In this idealized past, “the people should have no use for any form of writing save knotted ropes, should be contented with their food, pleased with their clothing, satisfied with their homes, should take pleasure in their rustic tasks." (chap. 80, tr. Waley)
[edit] Emptiness
We put thirty spokes together and call it a wheel; But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the wheel depends. We turn clay to make a vessel; But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the vessel depends. We pierce doors and windows to make a house; And it is on these spaces where there is nothing that the usefulness of the house depends. Therefore just as we take advantage of what is, we should recognize the usefulness of what is not. (chap. 11, tr. Waley)
Philosophical vacuity is a common theme among Asian wisdom traditions including Taoism (especially Wu wei "effortless action"), Buddhism, and some aspects of Confucianism. One could interpret the Tao Te Ching as a suite of variations on the "Powers of Nothingness". This resonates with the Buddhist Shunyata philosophy of "form is emptiness, emptiness is form."
Looking at a traditional Chinese Landscape, one can understand how emptiness (the unpainted) has the power of animating the trees, mountains, and rivers it surrounds. Emptiness can mean having no fixed preconceptions, preferences, intentions, or agenda. Since "The Sage has no heart of his own; He uses the heart of the people as his heart." (chap. 49, tr. Waley). From a ruler's point of view, it is a laissez-faire approach:
So a wise leader may say: "I practice inaction, and the people look after themselves." But from the Sage it is so hard at any price to get a single word That when his task is accomplished, his work done, Throughout the country every one says: “It happened of its own accord”. (chap. 17, tr. Waley)
[edit] Knowledge and humility
Knowing others is wisdom; Knowing the self is enlightenment. Mastering others requires force; Mastering the self requires strength; He who knows he has enough is rich. Perseverance is a sign of will power. He who stays where he is endures. To die but not to perish is to be eternally present. (chap. 33, tr. Feng and English)
The Tao Te Ching praises self-gained knowledge with emphasis on that knowledge being gained with humility. When what one person has experienced is put into words and transmitted to others, so doing risks giving unwarranted status to what inevitably must have had a subjective tinge. Moreover, it will be subjected to another layer of interpretation and subjectivity when read and learned by others. This kind of knowledge (or "book learning"), like desire, should be diminished. "It was when intelligence and knowledge appeared that the Great Artifice began." (chap. 18, tr. Waley) And so, "The pursuit of learning is to increase day after day. The pursuit of Tao is to decrease day after day." (chap. 48, tr. W.T. Chan)
[edit] Interpretations in relation to religious traditions
The relation between Taoism and Buddhism and Chan Buddhism is complex and fertile. Similarly, the relationship between Taoism and Confucianism is richly interwoven, historically.
In 1823 the French sinologist Jean-Pierre-Abel Rémusat suggested a relationship between Abrahamic faiths and Taoism; he held that Yahweh was signified by three words in Chapter 14; yi (夷 "calm; level; barbarian"), xi (希 "rare; indiscernible; hope"), and wei (微 "tiny, small; obscure"). James Legge (1891:57-58[6]) dismissed this hypothetical yi-xi-wei and Yahweh connection as "a mere fancy or dream". According to Holmes Welch:
It is not hard to understand the readiness of early scholars to assert that the doctrine of the Trinity was revealed in the Tao Te Ching and that its fourteenth chapter contains the syllables of "Yahveh." Even today, though these errors have been recognized for more than a century, the general notion that Lao Tzu was Christ's forerunner has lost none of its romantic appeal. (1965:7)
[edit] Translations
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Tao Te Ching
The Tao Te Ching has been translated into Western languages over 250 times, mostly to English, German, and French.[7] According to Holmes Welch, "It is a famous puzzle which everyone would like to feel he had solved."[8]
Many translations are written by people with a foundation in Chinese language and philosophy who are trying to render the original meaning of the text as faithfully as possible into English. Some of the more popular translations are written from a less scholarly perspective, giving an individual author's interpretation. Critics of these versions, such as Taoism scholar Eugene Eoyang, claim that translators like Stephen Mitchell produce readings of the Tao Te Ching that deviate from the text and are incompatible with the history of Chinese thought.[9] Russell Kirkland goes further to argue that these versions are based on Western Orientalist fantasies, and represent the colonial appropriation of Chinese culture.[10][11] In contrast, Huston Smith, scholar of world religions, said of the Mitchell version, "This translation comes as close to being definitive for our time as any I can imagine. It embodies the virtues its translator credits to the Chinese original: a gemlike lucidity that is radiant with humor, grace, largeheartedness, and deep wisdom." —Other Taoism scholars, such as Michael LaFargue[12] and Johnathan Herman,[13] argue that while they are poor scholarship they meet a real spiritual need in the West. The most recent translation is by Bill Porter (Red Pine) (Copper Canyon Press, 2009) and distinguishes itself in its extensive commentary by scores of poets, monks, and Chinese scholars.[14] There are a handful of sites on the web that compare chapters translated by various authors such as TaoTeChingMe.com[15] and Waylist.org. [16]
[edit] Translational difficulties
The Tao Te Ching is written in classical Chinese, which can be difficult to understand completely, even for well-educated native speakers of modern Chinese. In fact, in learning classical Chinese, native speakers can be at a disadvantage relative to non-native speakers, as native speakers often have difficulty with Chinese characters whose older meaning differs from the modern language. Classical Chinese relies heavily on allusion to a corpus of standard literary works to convey semantic meaning, nuance, and subtext. This corpus was memorized by highly-educated people in Laozi's time, and the allusions were reinforced through common use in writing, but few people today have this type of deep acquaintance with ancient Chinese literature. Thus, many levels of subtext are potentially lost on modern translators. Furthermore, many of the words that the Tao Te Ching uses are deliberately vague and ambiguous.
Since there are no punctuation marks in classical Chinese, it can be difficult to conclusively determine where one sentence ends and the next begins. Moving a full-stop a few words forward or back or inserting a comma can profoundly alter the meaning of many passages, and such divisions and meanings must be determined by the translator. Some editors and translators argue that the received text is so corrupted (from originally being written on one-line bamboo strips linked with silk threads) that it is impossible to understand some chapters without moving sequences of characters from one place to another.
[edit] See also
Taoism portal
Daoism-Taoism romanization issue
Eastern philosophy
Zhuangzi (book)
Huainanzi
Liezi
Qingjing Jing
Huahujing
Xishengjing
[edit] Notes
1.^ a b c d e "Laozi". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Stanford University.
2.^ "The Tao Teh King, or the Tao and its Characteristics by Laozi - Project Gutenberg". Gutenberg.org. 2007-12-01. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
3.^ Eliade (1984), p.26
4.^ Boltz (1993): 284
5.^ Henricks (2000) Lao Tzu's Tao Teh Ching - A translation of the startling new documents found at Guodian, page 3
6.^ "Texts of Taoism (SBE 39): The Tao Teh King, Part I: Chapter 14". Sacred-texts.com. Retrieved 2011-03-16.
7.^ LaFargue, Michael and Pas, Julian. On Translating the Tao-te-ching in Kohn and LaFargue (1998), p. 277
8.^ Welch (1965), p. 7
9.^ The Journal of Religion
10.^ [1][dead link]
11.^ "Taoism: the enduring tradition - Google Books". Books.google.com. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
12.^ [2][dead link]
13.^ Journal of the American Academy of Religion
14.^ Lao-Tzu's Taoteching
15.^ Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
16.^ Tao Teh Ching - Line-by-Line Comparisons.
[edit] References
Ariel, Yoav, and Gil Raz. “Anaphors or Cataphors? A Discussion of the Two qi 其 Graphs in the First Chapter of the Daodejing.” PEW 60.3 (2010): 391-421
Boltz, William G. Lao tzu Tao te ching. In Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, edited by Michael Loewe. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies. 1993. pp. 269–92.
Cole, Alan, "Simplicity for the Sophisticated: ReReading the Daode Jing for the Polemics of Ease and Innocence," in History of Religions, August 2006, pp. 1-49
Damascene, Hieromonk, Lou Shibai, and You-Shan Tang. Christ the Eternal Tao. Platina, CA: Saint Herman Press, 1999.
Eliade, Mircea. A History of Religious Ideas, Volume 2. Translated by Willard R. Trask. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Kaltenmark, Max. Lao Tzu and Taoism. Translated by Roger Greaves. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1969.
Kohn, Livia and Michael LaFargue, eds. Lao-Tzu and the Tao-Te-Ching, Albany: State University of New York Press. 1998.
Komjathy, Louis. Handbooks for Daoist Practice. 10 vols. Hong Kong: Yuen Yuen Institute, 2008.
Welch, Holmes. Taoism: The Parting of the Way (1957). Boston: Beacon Press. 1965.
Klaus, Hilmar Das Tao der Weisheit. Laozi-Daodejing. English + German introduction, 140 p. bibliogr., 3 German transl. Aachen: Mainz 2008, 548 p.
Klaus, Hilmar The Tao of Wisdom. Laozi-Daodejing. Chinese-English-German. 2 verbatim + 2 analogous transl., 140 p. bibl., Aachen: Mainz 2009 600p.
[edit] External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Tao Te Ching
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Tao Te Ching
Chinese Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Dàodéjīng
Daode jing entry from the Center for Daoist Studies
Daodejing Wang Bi edition with English translation, Guodian text, and Mawangdui text - Chinese Text Project
Lǎozǐ Dàodéjīng Chinese + English + German, verbatim + analogous
Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
The Authorship of the Tao Te Ching, John J. Emerson
Tao Te Ching at the Open Directory Project
Daode jing (Isabelle Robinet), entry in The Encyclopedia of Taoism
The Call of Silence - Reflections on the Tao-Teh-King by Abdullah Dougan, a recent interpretation.
[edit] Online English translations
Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
Tao Te Ching | Multiple English Translations
Tao Te Ching, James Legge
The Tao Te Ching, Frederic H. Balfour
The Tao Teh King, Aleister Crowley
Daode Jing, Charles Muller
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
道德经 Dàodéjīng
The Tao Te Ching, Dao De Jing, or Daodejing (道德經), also simply referred to as Laozi,[1] whose authorship has been attributed to Laozi,[2] is a Chinese classic text. Its name comes from the opening words of its two sections: 道 dào "way," Chapter 1, and 德 dé "virtue/power," Chapter 38, plus 經 jīng "classic." According to tradition, it was written around the 6th century BC by the sage Laozi (or Lao Tzu, "Old Master"), a record-keeper at the Zhou Dynasty court, by whose name the text is known in China. The text's true authorship and date of composition or compilation are still debated,[3] although the oldest excavated text dates back to the late 4th century BC.[1]
The text is fundamental to the Philosophical Taoism (Daojia (Pinyin: Dàojiā) 道家) and strongly influenced other schools, such as Legalism and Neo-Confucianism. This ancient book is also central in Chinese religion, not only for Religious Daoism (Daojiao (Pinyin: Dàojiào) 道教) but Chinese Buddhism, which when first introduced into China was largely interpreted through the use of Daoist words and concepts. Many Chinese artists, including poets, painters, calligraphers, and even gardeners have used the Daodejing as a source of inspiration. Its influence has also spread widely outside East Asia, and is amongst the most translated works in world literature.[1]
The Wade–Giles romanization "Tao Te Ching" dates back to early English transliterations in the late 19th century, and many people continue using it, especially for words and phrases that have become well-established in English. The pinyin romanization "Daodejing" originated in the late 20th century, and this romanization is becoming increasingly popular, having been adopted as the official system by the Chinese government.
Contents
[hide] 1 The text 1.1 Title
1.2 Internal structure
1.3 Historical authenticity of the author
1.4 Principal versions
1.5 Mawangdui and Guodian texts
1.6 Written style
2 Interpretation and themes 2.1 Ineffability or Genesis
2.2 The Mysterious Female
2.3 Returning (Union with the Primordial)
2.4 Emptiness
2.5 Knowledge and humility
2.6 Interpretations in relation to religious traditions
3 Translations 3.1 Translational difficulties
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References
7 External links 7.1 Online English translations
[edit] The text
The Daodejing has a long and complex textual history. On one hand, there are transmitted versions and commentaries that date back two millennia; on the other, there are ancient bamboo, silk, and paper manuscripts that archeologists discovered in the last century.
[edit] Title
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"Tao Te Ching", Calligraphy by Gia-Fu Feng
There are many possible translations of the book's title:
Dào/Tao 道 literally means "way", or one of its synonyms, but was extended to mean "the Way." This term, which was variously used by other Chinese philosophers (including Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, and Hanfeizi), has special meaning within the context of Daoism, where it implies the essential, unnamable process of the universe.
Dé/Te 德 basically means "virtue" in the sense of "personal character," "inner strength" (virtuosity), or "integrity." The semantics of this Chinese word resemble English virtue, which developed from a (now archaic) sense of "inner potency" or "divine power" (as in "healing virtue of a drug") to the modern meaning of "moral excellence" or "goodness." Compare the compound word dàodé (道德 "ethics," "ethical principles," "morals," or "morality").
Jīng/Ching 經 as it is used here means "canon," "great book," or "classic."
Thus, Daodejing can be translated as "The Classic/Canon of the Way/Path and the Power/Virtue," etc.
The title Daodejing is an honorific given by posterity, other titles include the amalgam Lǎozǐ Dàodéjīng (老子道德經), the honorific Daode Zhen Jing (道德真經 "True Classic of the Way and the Power"), and the Wuqian wen (五千文 "Five thousand character [classic]").
[edit] Internal structure
The received Tao Te Ching is a short text of around 5,000 Chinese characters in 81 brief chapters or sections (章). There is some evidence that the chapter divisions were later additions - for commentary, or as aids to rote memorization - and that the original text was more fluidly organized. It has two parts, the Tao Ching (道經; chaps. 1–37) and the Te Ching (德經; chaps. 38–81), which may have been edited together into the received text, possibly reversed from an original "Te Tao Ching". The written style is laconic, has few grammatical particles, and encourages varied, even contradictory interpretations. The ideas are singular; the style poetic.
The Chinese characters in the original versions were probably written in zhuànshū (篆書 seal script), while later versions were written in lìshū (隷書 clerical script) and kǎishū (楷書 regular script) styles. Daoist Chinese Characters contains a good summary of these different calligraphies.
[edit] Historical authenticity of the author
The Tao Te Ching is ascribed to Laozi, whose historical existence has been a matter of scholastic debate. His name, which means "Old Master", has only fueled controversy on this issue. (Kaltenmark 1969:10).
Laozi
The first reliable reference to Laozi is his "biography" in Shiji (63, tr. Chan 1963:35-37), by Chinese historian Sima Qian (ca. 145–86 BC), which combines three stories. First, Laozi was a contemporary of Confucius (551-479 BC). His surname was Li (李 "plum"), and his personal name was Er (耳 "ear") or Dan (聃 "long ear"). He was an official in the imperial archives, and wrote a book in two parts before departing to the West. Second, Laozi was Lao Laizi (老來子 "Old Come Master"), also a contemporary of Confucius, who wrote a book in 15 parts. Third, Laozi was the Grand Historian and astrologer Lao Dan (老聃 "Old Long-ears"), who lived during the reign (384-362 BC) of Duke Xian (獻公) of Qin).
Generations of scholars have debated the historicity of Laozi and the dating of the Tao Te Ching. Linguistic studies of the text's vocabulary and rhyme scheme point to a date of composition after the Shi Jing yet before the Zhuangzi. Legends claim variously that Laozi was "born old"; that he lived for 996 years, with twelve previous incarnations starting around the time of the Three Sovereigns before the thirteenth as Laozi. Some Western scholars have expressed doubts over Laozi's historical existence, claiming that the Tao Te Ching is actually a collection of the work of various authors.
Many Taoists venerate Laozi as Daotsu the founder of the school of Dao, the Daode Tianjun in the Three Pure Ones, one of the eight elders transformed from Taiji in the Chinese creation myth.
[edit] Principal versions
Among the many transmitted editions of the Tao Te Ching text, the three primary ones are named after early commentaries. The "Yan Zun Version," which is only extant for the Te Ching, derives from a commentary attributed to Han Dynasty scholar Yan Zun (巖尊, fl. 80 BC-10 AD). The "Heshang Gong Version" is named after the legendary Heshang Gong (河上公 "Riverside Sage") who supposedly lived during the reign (202-157 BC) of Emperor Wen of Han. This commentary (tr. Erkes 1950) has a preface written by Ge Xuan (葛玄, 164-244 AD), granduncle of Ge Hong, and scholarship dates this version to around the 3rd century AD. The "Wang Bi Version" has more verifiable origins than either of the above. Wang Bi (王弼, 226 – 249 AD) was a famous Three Kingdoms period philosopher and commentator on the Tao Te Ching (tr. Lin 1977, Rump and Chan 1979) and the I Ching.
Tao Te Ching scholarship has lately advanced from archeological discoveries of manuscripts, some of which are older than any of the received texts. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, Marc Aurel Stein and others found thousands of scrolls in the Mogao Caves near Dunhuang. They included more than 50 partial and complete "Tao Te Ching" manuscripts. One written by the scribe So/Su Dan (素統) is dated 270 AD and corresponds closely with the Heshang Gong version. Another partial manuscript has the Xiang'er (想爾) commentary, which had previously been lost.
[edit] Mawangdui and Guodian texts
In 1973, archeologists discovered copies of early Chinese books, known as the Mawangdui Silk Texts, in a tomb dating from 168 BC.[1] They included two nearly complete copies of the text, referred to as Text A (甲) and Text B (乙), both of which reverse the traditional ordering and put the Te Ching section before the Tao Ching, which is why the Henricks translation of them is named "Te-Tao Ching". Based on calligraphic styles and imperial naming taboo avoidances, scholars believe that A can be dated to about the first decade and B to about the third decade of the 2nd century BC.[4]
In 1993, the oldest known version of the text, written on bamboo tablets, was found in a tomb near the town of Guodian (郭店) in Jingmen, Hubei, and dated prior to 300 BC.[1] The Guodian Chu Slips comprise about 800 slips of bamboo with a total of over 13,000 characters, about 2,000 of which correspond with the Tao Te Ching, including 14 previously unknown verses.
Both the Mawangdui and Guodian versions are generally consistent with the received texts, excepting differences in chapter sequence and graphic variants. Several recent Tao Te Ching translations (e.g., Lau 1989, Henricks 1989, Mair 1990, Henricks 2000, Allan and Williams 2000, and Roberts 2004) utilize these two versions, sometimes with the verses reordered to synthesize the new finds.
[edit] Written style
The Tao Te Ching was originally written in zhuànshū calligraphy style. It is difficult to obtain modern replicas of these styles except through specialty stores. Most modern versions use the newspaper print style kǎishū.
[edit] Interpretation and themes
The passages are ambiguous, and topics range from political advice for rulers to practical wisdom for people. Because the variety of interpretation is virtually limitless, not only for different people but for the same person over time, readers do well to avoid making claims of objectivity or superiority. Also, since the book is 81 short poems, there is little need for an abridgement.
[edit] Ineffability or Genesis
The Way that can be told of is not an unvarying way; The names that can be named are not unvarying names. It was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang; The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures, each after its kind. (chap. 1, tr. Waley)
These famous first lines of the Tao Te Ching state that the Tao is ineffable, i.e., the Tao is nameless, goes beyond distinctions, and transcends language. However this first verse does not occur in the earliest known version from the Guodian Chu Slips and there is speculation that it may have been added by later commentators.[5] In Laozi's Qingjing Jing (verse 1-8) he clarified the term Tao was nominated as he was trying to describe a state of existence before it happened and before time or space. Way or path happened to be the side meaning of Tao, ineffability would be just poetic. This is the Chinese creation myth from the primordial Tao.
[edit] The Mysterious Female
The Valley Spirit never dies It is named the Mysterious Female. And the doorway of the Mysterious Female Is the base from which Heaven and Earth sprang. It is there within us all the while; Draw upon it as you will, it never runs dry. (chap. 6, tr. Waley)
Like the above description of the ineffable Tao as "the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures", the Tao Te Ching advocates "female" (or Yin) values, emphasizing the passive, solid, and quiescent qualities of nature (which is opposed to the active and energetic), and "having without possessing". Waley's translation can also be understood as the Esoteric Feminine in that it can be known intuitively, that must be complemented by the masculine, "male" (or Yang), again amplified in Qingjing Jing (verse 9-13). Yin and Yang should be balanced, "Know masculinity, Maintain femininity, and be a ravine for all under heaven." (chap. 28, tr. Mair)
[edit] Returning (Union with the Primordial)
In Tao the only motion is returning; The only useful quality, weakness. For though all creatures under heaven are the products of Being, Being itself is the product of Not-being. " (chap. 40, tr. Waley)
Another theme is the eternal return, or what Mair (1990:139) calls "the continual return of the myriad creatures to the cosmic principle from which they arose."
There is a contrast between the rigidity of death and the weakness of life: "When he is born, man is soft and weak; in death he becomes stiff and hard. The ten thousand creatures and all plants and trees while they are alive are supple and soft, but when dead they become brittle and dry." (chap. 76, tr. Waley). This is returning to the beginning of things, or to one's own childhood.
The Tao Te Ching focuses upon the beginnings of society, and describes a golden age in the past, comparable with the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Human problems arose from the "invention" of culture and civilization. In this idealized past, “the people should have no use for any form of writing save knotted ropes, should be contented with their food, pleased with their clothing, satisfied with their homes, should take pleasure in their rustic tasks." (chap. 80, tr. Waley)
[edit] Emptiness
We put thirty spokes together and call it a wheel; But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the wheel depends. We turn clay to make a vessel; But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the vessel depends. We pierce doors and windows to make a house; And it is on these spaces where there is nothing that the usefulness of the house depends. Therefore just as we take advantage of what is, we should recognize the usefulness of what is not. (chap. 11, tr. Waley)
Philosophical vacuity is a common theme among Asian wisdom traditions including Taoism (especially Wu wei "effortless action"), Buddhism, and some aspects of Confucianism. One could interpret the Tao Te Ching as a suite of variations on the "Powers of Nothingness". This resonates with the Buddhist Shunyata philosophy of "form is emptiness, emptiness is form."
Looking at a traditional Chinese Landscape, one can understand how emptiness (the unpainted) has the power of animating the trees, mountains, and rivers it surrounds. Emptiness can mean having no fixed preconceptions, preferences, intentions, or agenda. Since "The Sage has no heart of his own; He uses the heart of the people as his heart." (chap. 49, tr. Waley). From a ruler's point of view, it is a laissez-faire approach:
So a wise leader may say: "I practice inaction, and the people look after themselves." But from the Sage it is so hard at any price to get a single word That when his task is accomplished, his work done, Throughout the country every one says: “It happened of its own accord”. (chap. 17, tr. Waley)
[edit] Knowledge and humility
Knowing others is wisdom; Knowing the self is enlightenment. Mastering others requires force; Mastering the self requires strength; He who knows he has enough is rich. Perseverance is a sign of will power. He who stays where he is endures. To die but not to perish is to be eternally present. (chap. 33, tr. Feng and English)
The Tao Te Ching praises self-gained knowledge with emphasis on that knowledge being gained with humility. When what one person has experienced is put into words and transmitted to others, so doing risks giving unwarranted status to what inevitably must have had a subjective tinge. Moreover, it will be subjected to another layer of interpretation and subjectivity when read and learned by others. This kind of knowledge (or "book learning"), like desire, should be diminished. "It was when intelligence and knowledge appeared that the Great Artifice began." (chap. 18, tr. Waley) And so, "The pursuit of learning is to increase day after day. The pursuit of Tao is to decrease day after day." (chap. 48, tr. W.T. Chan)
[edit] Interpretations in relation to religious traditions
The relation between Taoism and Buddhism and Chan Buddhism is complex and fertile. Similarly, the relationship between Taoism and Confucianism is richly interwoven, historically.
In 1823 the French sinologist Jean-Pierre-Abel Rémusat suggested a relationship between Abrahamic faiths and Taoism; he held that Yahweh was signified by three words in Chapter 14; yi (夷 "calm; level; barbarian"), xi (希 "rare; indiscernible; hope"), and wei (微 "tiny, small; obscure"). James Legge (1891:57-58[6]) dismissed this hypothetical yi-xi-wei and Yahweh connection as "a mere fancy or dream". According to Holmes Welch:
It is not hard to understand the readiness of early scholars to assert that the doctrine of the Trinity was revealed in the Tao Te Ching and that its fourteenth chapter contains the syllables of "Yahveh." Even today, though these errors have been recognized for more than a century, the general notion that Lao Tzu was Christ's forerunner has lost none of its romantic appeal. (1965:7)
[edit] Translations
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Tao Te Ching
The Tao Te Ching has been translated into Western languages over 250 times, mostly to English, German, and French.[7] According to Holmes Welch, "It is a famous puzzle which everyone would like to feel he had solved."[8]
Many translations are written by people with a foundation in Chinese language and philosophy who are trying to render the original meaning of the text as faithfully as possible into English. Some of the more popular translations are written from a less scholarly perspective, giving an individual author's interpretation. Critics of these versions, such as Taoism scholar Eugene Eoyang, claim that translators like Stephen Mitchell produce readings of the Tao Te Ching that deviate from the text and are incompatible with the history of Chinese thought.[9] Russell Kirkland goes further to argue that these versions are based on Western Orientalist fantasies, and represent the colonial appropriation of Chinese culture.[10][11] In contrast, Huston Smith, scholar of world religions, said of the Mitchell version, "This translation comes as close to being definitive for our time as any I can imagine. It embodies the virtues its translator credits to the Chinese original: a gemlike lucidity that is radiant with humor, grace, largeheartedness, and deep wisdom." —Other Taoism scholars, such as Michael LaFargue[12] and Johnathan Herman,[13] argue that while they are poor scholarship they meet a real spiritual need in the West. The most recent translation is by Bill Porter (Red Pine) (Copper Canyon Press, 2009) and distinguishes itself in its extensive commentary by scores of poets, monks, and Chinese scholars.[14] There are a handful of sites on the web that compare chapters translated by various authors such as TaoTeChingMe.com[15] and Waylist.org. [16]
[edit] Translational difficulties
The Tao Te Ching is written in classical Chinese, which can be difficult to understand completely, even for well-educated native speakers of modern Chinese. In fact, in learning classical Chinese, native speakers can be at a disadvantage relative to non-native speakers, as native speakers often have difficulty with Chinese characters whose older meaning differs from the modern language. Classical Chinese relies heavily on allusion to a corpus of standard literary works to convey semantic meaning, nuance, and subtext. This corpus was memorized by highly-educated people in Laozi's time, and the allusions were reinforced through common use in writing, but few people today have this type of deep acquaintance with ancient Chinese literature. Thus, many levels of subtext are potentially lost on modern translators. Furthermore, many of the words that the Tao Te Ching uses are deliberately vague and ambiguous.
Since there are no punctuation marks in classical Chinese, it can be difficult to conclusively determine where one sentence ends and the next begins. Moving a full-stop a few words forward or back or inserting a comma can profoundly alter the meaning of many passages, and such divisions and meanings must be determined by the translator. Some editors and translators argue that the received text is so corrupted (from originally being written on one-line bamboo strips linked with silk threads) that it is impossible to understand some chapters without moving sequences of characters from one place to another.
[edit] See also
Taoism portal
Daoism-Taoism romanization issue
Eastern philosophy
Zhuangzi (book)
Huainanzi
Liezi
Qingjing Jing
Huahujing
Xishengjing
[edit] Notes
1.^ a b c d e "Laozi". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Stanford University.
2.^ "The Tao Teh King, or the Tao and its Characteristics by Laozi - Project Gutenberg". Gutenberg.org. 2007-12-01. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
3.^ Eliade (1984), p.26
4.^ Boltz (1993): 284
5.^ Henricks (2000) Lao Tzu's Tao Teh Ching - A translation of the startling new documents found at Guodian, page 3
6.^ "Texts of Taoism (SBE 39): The Tao Teh King, Part I: Chapter 14". Sacred-texts.com. Retrieved 2011-03-16.
7.^ LaFargue, Michael and Pas, Julian. On Translating the Tao-te-ching in Kohn and LaFargue (1998), p. 277
8.^ Welch (1965), p. 7
9.^ The Journal of Religion
10.^ [1][dead link]
11.^ "Taoism: the enduring tradition - Google Books". Books.google.com. Retrieved 2010-08-13.
12.^ [2][dead link]
13.^ Journal of the American Academy of Religion
14.^ Lao-Tzu's Taoteching
15.^ Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
16.^ Tao Teh Ching - Line-by-Line Comparisons.
[edit] References
Ariel, Yoav, and Gil Raz. “Anaphors or Cataphors? A Discussion of the Two qi 其 Graphs in the First Chapter of the Daodejing.” PEW 60.3 (2010): 391-421
Boltz, William G. Lao tzu Tao te ching. In Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, edited by Michael Loewe. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies. 1993. pp. 269–92.
Cole, Alan, "Simplicity for the Sophisticated: ReReading the Daode Jing for the Polemics of Ease and Innocence," in History of Religions, August 2006, pp. 1-49
Damascene, Hieromonk, Lou Shibai, and You-Shan Tang. Christ the Eternal Tao. Platina, CA: Saint Herman Press, 1999.
Eliade, Mircea. A History of Religious Ideas, Volume 2. Translated by Willard R. Trask. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Kaltenmark, Max. Lao Tzu and Taoism. Translated by Roger Greaves. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1969.
Kohn, Livia and Michael LaFargue, eds. Lao-Tzu and the Tao-Te-Ching, Albany: State University of New York Press. 1998.
Komjathy, Louis. Handbooks for Daoist Practice. 10 vols. Hong Kong: Yuen Yuen Institute, 2008.
Welch, Holmes. Taoism: The Parting of the Way (1957). Boston: Beacon Press. 1965.
Klaus, Hilmar Das Tao der Weisheit. Laozi-Daodejing. English + German introduction, 140 p. bibliogr., 3 German transl. Aachen: Mainz 2008, 548 p.
Klaus, Hilmar The Tao of Wisdom. Laozi-Daodejing. Chinese-English-German. 2 verbatim + 2 analogous transl., 140 p. bibl., Aachen: Mainz 2009 600p.
[edit] External links
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Tao Te Ching
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Tao Te Ching
Chinese Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Dàodéjīng
Daode jing entry from the Center for Daoist Studies
Daodejing Wang Bi edition with English translation, Guodian text, and Mawangdui text - Chinese Text Project
Lǎozǐ Dàodéjīng Chinese + English + German, verbatim + analogous
Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
The Authorship of the Tao Te Ching, John J. Emerson
Tao Te Ching at the Open Directory Project
Daode jing (Isabelle Robinet), entry in The Encyclopedia of Taoism
The Call of Silence - Reflections on the Tao-Teh-King by Abdullah Dougan, a recent interpretation.
[edit] Online English translations
Tao Te Ching | Multiple Translations by various authors
Tao Te Ching | Multiple English Translations
Tao Te Ching, James Legge
The Tao Te Ching, Frederic H. Balfour
The Tao Teh King, Aleister Crowley
Daode Jing, Charles Muller
Monday, October 10, 2011
How Dangerous Is U.S. Government Debt?
The Risks of a Sudden Spike in U.S. Interest Rates
Francis E. Warnock
June 2010
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the Belgian economist Robert Triffin described the dilemma faced by the country at the center of the international monetary system.1 To supply the world’s risk-free asset, the center country must run a current account deficit and in doing so become ever more indebted to foreigners, until the risk-free asset that it issues ceases to be risk free. Precisely because the world is happy to have a dependable asset to hold as a store of value, it will buy so much of that asset that its issuer will become unsustainably burdened. The endgame to Triffin’s
paradox is a global, wholesale dumping of the center country’s securities. No one knows in advance when the tipping point will be reached, but the damage brought about by higher interest rates and slower economic growth will be readily apparent afterward.For a long time now, the United States has seemed vulnerable to the fate that Triffin predicted.
Since 1982 it has run a current account deficit every year but one, steadily piling up obligations to foreigners. Because foreigners have been eager to hold dollar assets, they have willingly enabled this pattern, pouring capital into
the United States and financing the nation’s surplus of spending over savings. The dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency has become a facet of U.S. power, allowing the United States to borrow effortlessly and sustain large debt-financed military commitments.
Capital has tended to flood into the United States especially readily during moments of geopolitical stress, ensuring that the nation has had the financial wherewithal to conduct an assertive foreign policy precisely at moments when crises demanded it. But the capital inflows associated with the dollar’s reserve-currency status have created a vulnerability, too, opening the door to a foreign sell-off of U.S. securities that could drive up U.S. interest rates and render the nation’s formidable stock of debt far more expensive to service.
Late last year, this potential danger came close to becoming reality. Largely thanks to homegrown pressures, unrelated to Triffin’s dilemma, the world’s risk-free asset, the ten-year U.S. Treasury bond, was sagging.
With sizeable budget deficits, the prospects of an ever-increasing amount of government debt, the end of the Federal Reserve’s crisis-driven program of accumulating Treasury bonds, and an uptick in inflation expectations,
the ten-year Treasury yield increased by fifty basis points from 3.25 percent to 3.75 percent. And further increases were likely. Such increases would not only substantially raise the cost of future government borrowing, but would also threaten any recovery in housing and other interest-rate-sensitive sectors.
At the same time, moreover, foreigners seemed poised to drive U.S. borrowing costs higher. The dollar was falling sharply. Early in 2009 it fetched almost eighty euro cents in Frankfurt or Athens; by autumn it was worth sixty-seven euro cents.
Foreign investors, who held more than half of the U.S. Treasury market, were
getting nervous. Luo Ping, a director-general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, summed up the angst:
Except for U.S. Treasuries, what can you hold? Gold? You don’t hold Japanese government bonds or UK bonds. U.S. Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option . . . . We know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys, but there is nothing much we can do.
2 Was Triffin’s endgame—sudden reserve diversification, or the act of foreign governments abruptly shifting their funds from dollars to other currencies—about to become a reality? If so, the likeliest benefactor was the eurozone. Prominent economists opined that the euro would become the world’s reserve currency by as
early as 2015.
3 Through the first half of 2009 global investors seemed to agree: net inflows into eurozone debt instruments—that is, the rest of the world’s purchases of eurozone bonds less euro-area purchases of 2 foreign bonds—surged to record levels. The related plummeting of the dollar relative to the euro added to the
fear that global investors were abandoning the center country.
But then began the eurozone phase of the global financial crisis. This has provided the U.S. government with a timely respite from both domestic forces and Triffin’s endgame. U.S. policymakers need to understand that this is not a reset, not a new beginning; it is a lucky break. How the United States uses this reprieve will affect the nation’s ability to borrow for years to come, with broad implications for the sustainability of an active U.S. foreign policy.
In what follows we will walk through the domestic pressures on U.S. long-term interest rates, the role of global investors, the respite provided by the eurozone crisis, and policy implications. The story will be told primarily through pictures. For those interested in the methodology used to measure foreign official flows and a more detailed perspective on U.S. capital flows, a box and appendix are also provided.
DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON LONG-TERM RATES
In the autumn of 2009 at least three factors were weighing heavily on U.S. Treasury bond prices, driving interest rates (or “yields”) upward. Significantly, none of the three factors has diminished.
The first factor is the hangover from the financial crisis. On top of tax cuts and spending increases over the past decade, the stimulus spending and the decline in tax revenues resulting from the recession worsened the U.S. fiscal situation.
The budget deficit reached 10 percent of potential GDP in 2008, and even the baseline Congressional Budget Office forecast, which must include the implausible assumption that Congress will allow various “temporary” tax relief measures to expire, has U.S. public debt skyrocketing toward 100 percent of GDP (Figure 1, left panels).
4 Various economic theories provide a link from increases in either government debt (a stock figure) or budget deficits (a flow) and increases in interest rates, be it through the crowding out of private investment or through Keynesian increases in demand. Whatever theory one prefers,
Thomas Laubach showed that for each percentage point rise in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio, longer term interest rates increase by about twenty-five basis points (or 0.25 percent); alternatively, each percentage point rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio increases long rates by three to four basis points.5 Combining deficit (or debt) projections with the Laubach analysis, one might expect the fiscal situation to lead to a full percentage point (or even much greater) increase in long rates.
The second domestic factor exerting upward pressure on long rates is that demand from one source—the Federal Reserve—is likely to be scaled back. In 2009, the Fed purchased $300 billion in long-dated treasuries (Figure 1, right top panel). To the extent this put downward pressure on rates, the cessation of the Fed’s credit-
easing policy might be expected to lead to higher long rates.
A third factor on the radar screen is inflation expectations. An increase in inflation expectations can have a one-for-one impact on long-term nominal interest rates. Longer-term inflation expectations (Figure 1, right bottom panel) have been on a post-crisis upward march, putting yet more upward pressure on long rates.
In the autumn of 2009, the one domestic factor that was pulling rates lower was anything but comforting: concerns about a potential double-dip recession. As the U.S. recovery has strengthened, this factor has grown less significant. The result is that the balance of domestic forces in the United States now points to higher borrowing costs for the U.S. government. Adding together the pressure from large deficits, the cessation of the Fed’s crisis-response policies, and rising inflation expectations, one might expect the ten-year Treasury rate to
be at least one hundred basis points higher than it was a year ago. Oddly, and perhaps ominously, the actual ten-year Treasury rate at the start of June 2010 languishes at 3.4 percent, roughly unchanged from a year ago,
implying plenty of room for an upward spike.
THE ROLE OF GLOBAL INVESTORS
Not too long ago many were skeptical that foreign accumulation of U.S. debt securities materially affected U.S. rates. The view that such intervention did not matter was summed up concisely by the chief economist of an investment bank: “U.S. bond yields . . . have fluctuated over a wide range in response to many factors . . .but foreign buying . . . ha(s) simply not had much impact. Foreigners don’t have much influence . . .”6
At a July 2005 briefing, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) asked Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan of foreign flows could affect long-term U.S. interest rates. In Greenspan’s response to the senator, he noted that while foreign accumulation probably lowered long-term U.S. interest rates, the effect was likely small, and so the unwinding of those positions, were it to occur, would only add a small amount to long rates. But at that time no one had a good sense of the dynamics of foreign demand for U.S. bonds. To calculate the effect of this demand on Treasury rates, economists seek to isolate the portion of foreign demand that comes from governments: Unlike private foreign purchases, which may fluctuate in response to Treasury rates, foreign government purchases are presumed to be insensitive to Treasury rates, so that changes in those rates can be presumed to be driven by government buying rather than the other way around. Greenspan’s
response to Senator Shelby was based on calculations that used data on bonds held at the New York Fed on behalf of foreign governments. But, while governments use the New York Fed’s custodial services for some purchases, they also hold U.S. bonds elsewhere, so the analysis was based on partial data. And while there have been many user-friendly improvements over the past few years, international capital flows data remain
hard to navigate. (For a discussion of various sources of data on foreign governments’ purchases and sales of U.S. securities, see Box 1).
However, a 2005 Federal Reserve discussion paper pointed to a better answer than the one that was generally accepted at the time of Shelby’s question.7 The paper began by showing how reported capital flows data could be adjusted for use in empirical analysis. Briefly, because of a bias in the Treasury International Capital data collected by the U.S. government, flows from foreign official institutions were often reported as being
from private investors. Infrequent but high-quality snapshots of stocks (as opposed to flows) do not suffer from this bias (although they are subject to a less severe bias, described in the box) and so can be used to correct flows data. Armed with such data, the authors found that foreign official purchases of treasuries had little if any impact on shorter-term U.S. rates (which are well anchored by the Fed Funds rate) but a substantial impact on U.S. long-term interest rates. The accumulation of U.S. treasuries (and near substitutes) by foreign official institutions, then running at about $400 billion per year, lowered long-term U.S. interest rates by anywhere from fifty to one hundred basis points; if foreign governments ceased adding treasuries to their portfolios, U.S. long-term rates could spike upward by the same amount. The increase would be much greater
if foreign governments actively sold existing Treasury positions. Equally, a cessation of purchases or a sell-off by foreign private investors could add even more to the upward pressure on U.S. interest rates, since foreign private investors remain large buyers.
The potential impact on the United States resulting from a sell-off has not diminished since the original discussion paper calculations, because foreigners have not reduced the size of their positions. Foreigners now hold over half of the Treasury bond market and almost a fifth of the corporate debt market.
6
T H E N E A R M I S S O F 2 0 0 9
The large foreign holdings of U.S. assets presented in Table 1 are only a threat to the United States if there is a risk that foreigners might abandon past patterns and decide to put their money elsewhere. In 2009, with domestic conditions pointing toward a surge in Treasury yields, major investors were thinking aloud about doing just that—witness the concern expressed by China’s Luo Ping that his country’s accumulation of riskfree
dollar assets was anything but risk-free. At the same time, other senior foreign officials were actively debating the future of the dollar as the global reserve currency. On a visit to Beijing in May 2009, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, picked up on his hosts’ frustration with the U.S. currency. Calling for a “new economic order,” he suggested that it was time to stop denominating trade in dollars.
Sure enough, foreign flows into U.S. Treasury bonds declined steeply in the first months of 2009. Yet they remained positive, and recovered in the second half of the year (Figure 2). While not as pronounced as in 20032004, foreign appetite for the reserve asset remained at a high level.
Even though foreign appetite for U.S. treasuries remained healthy, this did not eliminate the risk to the United States. The reason was that U.S. debt issuance was increasing sharply, and foreigners were holding a 7 smaller share of outstanding U.S. bonds. This raised the specter of a future in which the United States would likely have to issue more and more bonds, but foreign demand might not keep pace.
In 2009 foreign official inflows either decreased or increased, and the amount of inflows was as high as $448 billion or as little as $36 billion. Nor is this extraordinary discrepancy confined to 2009. For 2010,such data as are currently available suggest that foreign official flows have either surged or plummeted.
Which is it?
Foreign Official Flows ($billions, annual averages)
20042007 2008 2009 2010
BEA’s Quarterly Balance of Payment (BOP) Data
Foreign official flows into the United States 406 487 448
U.S. Treasury securities 173 478 490
Short-term bills and certificates -7 272 63
Medium-to-long-term bonds and notes 181 205 427
U.S. agency securities 133 66 -39
Other foreign official inflows 100 -56 -4
13
Treasury’s Monthly TIC Data
through
March
Foreign official flows into the United States 213 158 36 -38
U.S. Treasury securities 82 336 238 2
Short-term bills and certificates -3 259 76 -28
Medium-to-long-term bonds and notes 86 77 161 30
U.S. agency securities 66 -32 -43 -4
Other foreign official inflows 64 -147 -159 -36
memo items: Selected Federal Reserve adjustments
Treasury bonds, foreign official flows 113 198
Treasury bonds, private flows -75 -104
New York Fed’s Weekly H.4.1 Custodial Data
through
May
Foreign official flows into the United States 253 383 418 319
Change in holdings of Treasury securities 116 203 543 304
Change in holdings of agency securities 137 180 -125 14
Annual averages, except for partial 2010 data.
The three data sources conflict because of different methodologies. The monthly TIC data “identifies” foreign
official flows as those that originate from a recognized foreign official institution. Any transaction run through a shell company or even a non-U.S. intermediary shows up in the TIC data, but not as a foreign official flow. That is, the TIC data on foreign official flows should be viewed as a lower bound. Hence, in Figures 2 and 6 both “identified” foreign official flows and total foreign flows are shown; true foreign official
flows are likely somewhere between the two lines.
One read on the extent of private flows that should be “shuffled” into foreign official flows is provided by Federal Reserve adjustments.
11 Those adjustments, shown in the “memo items” listed under the TIC data in
the above table, shift roughly $100 billion a year from private to foreign official inflows. These adjustments are, however, also partial, as they are based on a reconciliation of the monthly flows with annual snapshots of custodial holdings. That is, they replace a severe transaction center bias with a much less severe custodial
center bias.
12 While this is an improvement, even this adjustment cannot be viewed as complete as any foreign official institution that wants to mask its holdings can do so by using a foreign custodian.
13 The different reported amounts of foreign official inflows can be reconciled. The New York Fed’s H.4.1 data, the most timely, is custodial based and for only one custodian, the New York Fed. If foreign central banks choose not to utilize the New York Fed, or move bonds from their accounts at the New York Fed to other custodians, the H.4.1 data will not provide an accurate read of foreign official inflows. The TIC data by itself has a transaction center bias that in some cases will cause foreign official flows to be reported as private flows. Federal Reserve adjustments, by making monthly flows consistent with annual data on positions, transform this transaction center bias into a more benign custodial center bias (and also correct for some other problems with the flows data). The Bureau of Economic Analysis moves last and thus can incorporate all of these sources into what should be the most comprehensive view of foreign official flows into the United States. That view shows that foreign official inflows maintained a high level of over $400 billion per year during the financial crisis, although the composition changed dramatically.
In particular, foreign official institutions no longer accumulate agency and corporate bonds, instead focusing their purchases on Treasury securities.
To date in 2010, by focusing solely on TIC’s reported foreign official flows, one would conclude that foreign governments have greatly reduced their demand for U.S. Treasury securities. But, recognizing that many foreign official flows are not identified as such in the TIC data, and that (1) total foreign flows into
treasuries remain strong. Foreign governments’demand for U.S. Treasury securities remains as strong as ever.
This paper has zeroed in on a particular type of capital flow: foreigners’ purchases (and sales) of U.S. Treasury secAP urities. But it is also useful to keep the broader picture in mind. Thus, the appendix provides a broader (but
cursory) view of U.S. international capital flows, primarily through an annotated table of U.S. capital flows, which will be updated each quarter.
Net financial flows into the United States (line 7) slowed only slightly during the financial crisis, even as foreigners sharply curtailed their purchases of U.S. securities (included in line 15). Reason: At the same time, U.S. investors ceased their purchases of foreign securities (line 10). But in 2009, foreigners’ demand for U.S. securities remained tepid and U.S. investors’ purchases of foreign securities resumed to some extent, and thus net financial inflows into the U.S. slowed substantially. Things to consider over the rest of 2010: Will foreign
official institutions (line 16) maintain their large flows into the United States? Will FDI (line 24) and equity flows (line 25) into the United States maintain their recent levels and perhaps even increase? Will U.S. corporate bonds (line 30) become a desirable asset class once again? And will U.S. investors step up their diversification into foreign markets?
An oddity in recent BOP data is U.S. government assets abroad (line 14). Most years these flows are approximately zero, but in 2008 they were very large. Reason: Included in this category are the currency swaps initiated by the Fed. When they were put on (in 2008), they were recorded as large outflows; as they were undone n 2009, a large inflow was recorded. Over time these currency swaps are designed to sum to zero in BOP terms.
16
17
Endnotes
1. Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
2. Henny Sender, “China to Stick with U.S. Bonds,” FT.com, February 11, 2009.
3. See http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/2008/02/23/the-euro-could-surpass-the-dollar-within%2010-years/.
4. The baseline CBO forecast must assume policies remain as they currently are, which means that temporary spending provisions are assumed
to expire, even if in practice they are often extended. For a discussion of various deficit and debt forecasts, see Alan Auerbach and William Gale,
“Déjà Vu All Over Again: On the Dismal Prospects for the Federal Budget” (Brookings Institution mimeograph, 2010), which notes that the
main concern is not in deficits over the next year or two, but medium- and long-term deficits.
5. Laubach’s analysis is explicitly about five-year projections of deficits (and debt), so one should caution against using it to make statements
about the impact of cyclical deficits. It is more appropriate for longer-term fiscal trends. See Thomas Laubach, “New Evidence on the Interest
Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 858–885.
6. David Malpass, chief economist of Bear Stearns, quoted in “Their Money, Our Strength,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2004.
7. See Francis E Warnock and Veronica Cacdac Warnock, “International Capital Flows and U.S. Interest Rates,” Journal of International Money
and Finance, vol. 28 (2009), pp. 90319.
8. For a more eloquent discussion of salient features of the U.S. Treasury market, see Brian Sack, “Dollar Asset Markets: Prospects after the Crisis,”
remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia, March 26, 2010.
9. See, for example, Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker, “The Blue Bond Proposal,” Bruegel Policy Brief 2010/03.
10. See Sack, “Dollar Asset Markets.”
11. These adjustments, developed by Charles Thomas, Francis E. Warnock, and Jon Wongswan in “The Performance of International Equity
Portfolios” (NBER Working Paper 12346, 2006) and refined by Carol Bertaut and Ralph Tryon in “Monthly Estimates of U.S. Cross-Border
Securities Positions” (FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 910, 2007), are updated each year on http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/ifdp/2007/910/default.htm.
12. The transactions center bias in the TIC data on long-term securities flows derives from the fact that the respondents are asked to identify the
country through which the transaction was made, which can differ from the country of the ultimate buyer (in the case of inflows) or of the issuer
(in the case of outflows). Liabilities data collected on a custodial basis can also have a bias if the custodian and ultimate investor reside in different
countries. To see that the Federal Reserve adjustment is largely a removal of the transaction center bias, note that for Treasury bills, which are
collected by the TIC system on a custodial basis, the discrepancy between TIC and BOP data is quite modest.
13. Note that even with all available information, there is nothing pristine about transactions-based international capital flows data collected for
BOP purposes. A fundamental difficulty with such a data collection system is that it asks reporters to submit data that they would never collect on
their own. A financial intermediary would not naturally care about the residency of the parties on either side of a trade, but that is exactly what
BOP accounting rules ask them to do. More natural might be to obtain higher frequency reads on cross-border positions, something naturally
collected by custodians, and use them to calculate flows.
18
About the Author
Francis E. Warnock is Paul M. Hammaker associate professor of business administration at the Darden
Business School, University of Virginia, research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
senior fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’s Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, and research
associate at Trinity College Dublin’s Institute for International Integration Studies.
Francis E. Warnock
June 2010
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the Belgian economist Robert Triffin described the dilemma faced by the country at the center of the international monetary system.1 To supply the world’s risk-free asset, the center country must run a current account deficit and in doing so become ever more indebted to foreigners, until the risk-free asset that it issues ceases to be risk free. Precisely because the world is happy to have a dependable asset to hold as a store of value, it will buy so much of that asset that its issuer will become unsustainably burdened. The endgame to Triffin’s
paradox is a global, wholesale dumping of the center country’s securities. No one knows in advance when the tipping point will be reached, but the damage brought about by higher interest rates and slower economic growth will be readily apparent afterward.For a long time now, the United States has seemed vulnerable to the fate that Triffin predicted.
Since 1982 it has run a current account deficit every year but one, steadily piling up obligations to foreigners. Because foreigners have been eager to hold dollar assets, they have willingly enabled this pattern, pouring capital into
the United States and financing the nation’s surplus of spending over savings. The dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency has become a facet of U.S. power, allowing the United States to borrow effortlessly and sustain large debt-financed military commitments.
Capital has tended to flood into the United States especially readily during moments of geopolitical stress, ensuring that the nation has had the financial wherewithal to conduct an assertive foreign policy precisely at moments when crises demanded it. But the capital inflows associated with the dollar’s reserve-currency status have created a vulnerability, too, opening the door to a foreign sell-off of U.S. securities that could drive up U.S. interest rates and render the nation’s formidable stock of debt far more expensive to service.
Late last year, this potential danger came close to becoming reality. Largely thanks to homegrown pressures, unrelated to Triffin’s dilemma, the world’s risk-free asset, the ten-year U.S. Treasury bond, was sagging.
With sizeable budget deficits, the prospects of an ever-increasing amount of government debt, the end of the Federal Reserve’s crisis-driven program of accumulating Treasury bonds, and an uptick in inflation expectations,
the ten-year Treasury yield increased by fifty basis points from 3.25 percent to 3.75 percent. And further increases were likely. Such increases would not only substantially raise the cost of future government borrowing, but would also threaten any recovery in housing and other interest-rate-sensitive sectors.
At the same time, moreover, foreigners seemed poised to drive U.S. borrowing costs higher. The dollar was falling sharply. Early in 2009 it fetched almost eighty euro cents in Frankfurt or Athens; by autumn it was worth sixty-seven euro cents.
Foreign investors, who held more than half of the U.S. Treasury market, were
getting nervous. Luo Ping, a director-general at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, summed up the angst:
Except for U.S. Treasuries, what can you hold? Gold? You don’t hold Japanese government bonds or UK bonds. U.S. Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option . . . . We know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys, but there is nothing much we can do.
2 Was Triffin’s endgame—sudden reserve diversification, or the act of foreign governments abruptly shifting their funds from dollars to other currencies—about to become a reality? If so, the likeliest benefactor was the eurozone. Prominent economists opined that the euro would become the world’s reserve currency by as
early as 2015.
3 Through the first half of 2009 global investors seemed to agree: net inflows into eurozone debt instruments—that is, the rest of the world’s purchases of eurozone bonds less euro-area purchases of 2 foreign bonds—surged to record levels. The related plummeting of the dollar relative to the euro added to the
fear that global investors were abandoning the center country.
But then began the eurozone phase of the global financial crisis. This has provided the U.S. government with a timely respite from both domestic forces and Triffin’s endgame. U.S. policymakers need to understand that this is not a reset, not a new beginning; it is a lucky break. How the United States uses this reprieve will affect the nation’s ability to borrow for years to come, with broad implications for the sustainability of an active U.S. foreign policy.
In what follows we will walk through the domestic pressures on U.S. long-term interest rates, the role of global investors, the respite provided by the eurozone crisis, and policy implications. The story will be told primarily through pictures. For those interested in the methodology used to measure foreign official flows and a more detailed perspective on U.S. capital flows, a box and appendix are also provided.
DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON LONG-TERM RATES
In the autumn of 2009 at least three factors were weighing heavily on U.S. Treasury bond prices, driving interest rates (or “yields”) upward. Significantly, none of the three factors has diminished.
The first factor is the hangover from the financial crisis. On top of tax cuts and spending increases over the past decade, the stimulus spending and the decline in tax revenues resulting from the recession worsened the U.S. fiscal situation.
The budget deficit reached 10 percent of potential GDP in 2008, and even the baseline Congressional Budget Office forecast, which must include the implausible assumption that Congress will allow various “temporary” tax relief measures to expire, has U.S. public debt skyrocketing toward 100 percent of GDP (Figure 1, left panels).
4 Various economic theories provide a link from increases in either government debt (a stock figure) or budget deficits (a flow) and increases in interest rates, be it through the crowding out of private investment or through Keynesian increases in demand. Whatever theory one prefers,
Thomas Laubach showed that for each percentage point rise in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio, longer term interest rates increase by about twenty-five basis points (or 0.25 percent); alternatively, each percentage point rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio increases long rates by three to four basis points.5 Combining deficit (or debt) projections with the Laubach analysis, one might expect the fiscal situation to lead to a full percentage point (or even much greater) increase in long rates.
The second domestic factor exerting upward pressure on long rates is that demand from one source—the Federal Reserve—is likely to be scaled back. In 2009, the Fed purchased $300 billion in long-dated treasuries (Figure 1, right top panel). To the extent this put downward pressure on rates, the cessation of the Fed’s credit-
easing policy might be expected to lead to higher long rates.
A third factor on the radar screen is inflation expectations. An increase in inflation expectations can have a one-for-one impact on long-term nominal interest rates. Longer-term inflation expectations (Figure 1, right bottom panel) have been on a post-crisis upward march, putting yet more upward pressure on long rates.
In the autumn of 2009, the one domestic factor that was pulling rates lower was anything but comforting: concerns about a potential double-dip recession. As the U.S. recovery has strengthened, this factor has grown less significant. The result is that the balance of domestic forces in the United States now points to higher borrowing costs for the U.S. government. Adding together the pressure from large deficits, the cessation of the Fed’s crisis-response policies, and rising inflation expectations, one might expect the ten-year Treasury rate to
be at least one hundred basis points higher than it was a year ago. Oddly, and perhaps ominously, the actual ten-year Treasury rate at the start of June 2010 languishes at 3.4 percent, roughly unchanged from a year ago,
implying plenty of room for an upward spike.
THE ROLE OF GLOBAL INVESTORS
Not too long ago many were skeptical that foreign accumulation of U.S. debt securities materially affected U.S. rates. The view that such intervention did not matter was summed up concisely by the chief economist of an investment bank: “U.S. bond yields . . . have fluctuated over a wide range in response to many factors . . .but foreign buying . . . ha(s) simply not had much impact. Foreigners don’t have much influence . . .”6
At a July 2005 briefing, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) asked Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan of foreign flows could affect long-term U.S. interest rates. In Greenspan’s response to the senator, he noted that while foreign accumulation probably lowered long-term U.S. interest rates, the effect was likely small, and so the unwinding of those positions, were it to occur, would only add a small amount to long rates. But at that time no one had a good sense of the dynamics of foreign demand for U.S. bonds. To calculate the effect of this demand on Treasury rates, economists seek to isolate the portion of foreign demand that comes from governments: Unlike private foreign purchases, which may fluctuate in response to Treasury rates, foreign government purchases are presumed to be insensitive to Treasury rates, so that changes in those rates can be presumed to be driven by government buying rather than the other way around. Greenspan’s
response to Senator Shelby was based on calculations that used data on bonds held at the New York Fed on behalf of foreign governments. But, while governments use the New York Fed’s custodial services for some purchases, they also hold U.S. bonds elsewhere, so the analysis was based on partial data. And while there have been many user-friendly improvements over the past few years, international capital flows data remain
hard to navigate. (For a discussion of various sources of data on foreign governments’ purchases and sales of U.S. securities, see Box 1).
However, a 2005 Federal Reserve discussion paper pointed to a better answer than the one that was generally accepted at the time of Shelby’s question.7 The paper began by showing how reported capital flows data could be adjusted for use in empirical analysis. Briefly, because of a bias in the Treasury International Capital data collected by the U.S. government, flows from foreign official institutions were often reported as being
from private investors. Infrequent but high-quality snapshots of stocks (as opposed to flows) do not suffer from this bias (although they are subject to a less severe bias, described in the box) and so can be used to correct flows data. Armed with such data, the authors found that foreign official purchases of treasuries had little if any impact on shorter-term U.S. rates (which are well anchored by the Fed Funds rate) but a substantial impact on U.S. long-term interest rates. The accumulation of U.S. treasuries (and near substitutes) by foreign official institutions, then running at about $400 billion per year, lowered long-term U.S. interest rates by anywhere from fifty to one hundred basis points; if foreign governments ceased adding treasuries to their portfolios, U.S. long-term rates could spike upward by the same amount. The increase would be much greater
if foreign governments actively sold existing Treasury positions. Equally, a cessation of purchases or a sell-off by foreign private investors could add even more to the upward pressure on U.S. interest rates, since foreign private investors remain large buyers.
The potential impact on the United States resulting from a sell-off has not diminished since the original discussion paper calculations, because foreigners have not reduced the size of their positions. Foreigners now hold over half of the Treasury bond market and almost a fifth of the corporate debt market.
6
T H E N E A R M I S S O F 2 0 0 9
The large foreign holdings of U.S. assets presented in Table 1 are only a threat to the United States if there is a risk that foreigners might abandon past patterns and decide to put their money elsewhere. In 2009, with domestic conditions pointing toward a surge in Treasury yields, major investors were thinking aloud about doing just that—witness the concern expressed by China’s Luo Ping that his country’s accumulation of riskfree
dollar assets was anything but risk-free. At the same time, other senior foreign officials were actively debating the future of the dollar as the global reserve currency. On a visit to Beijing in May 2009, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, picked up on his hosts’ frustration with the U.S. currency. Calling for a “new economic order,” he suggested that it was time to stop denominating trade in dollars.
Sure enough, foreign flows into U.S. Treasury bonds declined steeply in the first months of 2009. Yet they remained positive, and recovered in the second half of the year (Figure 2). While not as pronounced as in 20032004, foreign appetite for the reserve asset remained at a high level.
Even though foreign appetite for U.S. treasuries remained healthy, this did not eliminate the risk to the United States. The reason was that U.S. debt issuance was increasing sharply, and foreigners were holding a 7 smaller share of outstanding U.S. bonds. This raised the specter of a future in which the United States would likely have to issue more and more bonds, but foreign demand might not keep pace.
In 2009 foreign official inflows either decreased or increased, and the amount of inflows was as high as $448 billion or as little as $36 billion. Nor is this extraordinary discrepancy confined to 2009. For 2010,such data as are currently available suggest that foreign official flows have either surged or plummeted.
Which is it?
Foreign Official Flows ($billions, annual averages)
20042007 2008 2009 2010
BEA’s Quarterly Balance of Payment (BOP) Data
Foreign official flows into the United States 406 487 448
U.S. Treasury securities 173 478 490
Short-term bills and certificates -7 272 63
Medium-to-long-term bonds and notes 181 205 427
U.S. agency securities 133 66 -39
Other foreign official inflows 100 -56 -4
13
Treasury’s Monthly TIC Data
through
March
Foreign official flows into the United States 213 158 36 -38
U.S. Treasury securities 82 336 238 2
Short-term bills and certificates -3 259 76 -28
Medium-to-long-term bonds and notes 86 77 161 30
U.S. agency securities 66 -32 -43 -4
Other foreign official inflows 64 -147 -159 -36
memo items: Selected Federal Reserve adjustments
Treasury bonds, foreign official flows 113 198
Treasury bonds, private flows -75 -104
New York Fed’s Weekly H.4.1 Custodial Data
through
May
Foreign official flows into the United States 253 383 418 319
Change in holdings of Treasury securities 116 203 543 304
Change in holdings of agency securities 137 180 -125 14
Annual averages, except for partial 2010 data.
The three data sources conflict because of different methodologies. The monthly TIC data “identifies” foreign
official flows as those that originate from a recognized foreign official institution. Any transaction run through a shell company or even a non-U.S. intermediary shows up in the TIC data, but not as a foreign official flow. That is, the TIC data on foreign official flows should be viewed as a lower bound. Hence, in Figures 2 and 6 both “identified” foreign official flows and total foreign flows are shown; true foreign official
flows are likely somewhere between the two lines.
One read on the extent of private flows that should be “shuffled” into foreign official flows is provided by Federal Reserve adjustments.
11 Those adjustments, shown in the “memo items” listed under the TIC data in
the above table, shift roughly $100 billion a year from private to foreign official inflows. These adjustments are, however, also partial, as they are based on a reconciliation of the monthly flows with annual snapshots of custodial holdings. That is, they replace a severe transaction center bias with a much less severe custodial
center bias.
12 While this is an improvement, even this adjustment cannot be viewed as complete as any foreign official institution that wants to mask its holdings can do so by using a foreign custodian.
13 The different reported amounts of foreign official inflows can be reconciled. The New York Fed’s H.4.1 data, the most timely, is custodial based and for only one custodian, the New York Fed. If foreign central banks choose not to utilize the New York Fed, or move bonds from their accounts at the New York Fed to other custodians, the H.4.1 data will not provide an accurate read of foreign official inflows. The TIC data by itself has a transaction center bias that in some cases will cause foreign official flows to be reported as private flows. Federal Reserve adjustments, by making monthly flows consistent with annual data on positions, transform this transaction center bias into a more benign custodial center bias (and also correct for some other problems with the flows data). The Bureau of Economic Analysis moves last and thus can incorporate all of these sources into what should be the most comprehensive view of foreign official flows into the United States. That view shows that foreign official inflows maintained a high level of over $400 billion per year during the financial crisis, although the composition changed dramatically.
In particular, foreign official institutions no longer accumulate agency and corporate bonds, instead focusing their purchases on Treasury securities.
To date in 2010, by focusing solely on TIC’s reported foreign official flows, one would conclude that foreign governments have greatly reduced their demand for U.S. Treasury securities. But, recognizing that many foreign official flows are not identified as such in the TIC data, and that (1) total foreign flows into
treasuries remain strong. Foreign governments’demand for U.S. Treasury securities remains as strong as ever.
This paper has zeroed in on a particular type of capital flow: foreigners’ purchases (and sales) of U.S. Treasury secAP urities. But it is also useful to keep the broader picture in mind. Thus, the appendix provides a broader (but
cursory) view of U.S. international capital flows, primarily through an annotated table of U.S. capital flows, which will be updated each quarter.
Net financial flows into the United States (line 7) slowed only slightly during the financial crisis, even as foreigners sharply curtailed their purchases of U.S. securities (included in line 15). Reason: At the same time, U.S. investors ceased their purchases of foreign securities (line 10). But in 2009, foreigners’ demand for U.S. securities remained tepid and U.S. investors’ purchases of foreign securities resumed to some extent, and thus net financial inflows into the U.S. slowed substantially. Things to consider over the rest of 2010: Will foreign
official institutions (line 16) maintain their large flows into the United States? Will FDI (line 24) and equity flows (line 25) into the United States maintain their recent levels and perhaps even increase? Will U.S. corporate bonds (line 30) become a desirable asset class once again? And will U.S. investors step up their diversification into foreign markets?
An oddity in recent BOP data is U.S. government assets abroad (line 14). Most years these flows are approximately zero, but in 2008 they were very large. Reason: Included in this category are the currency swaps initiated by the Fed. When they were put on (in 2008), they were recorded as large outflows; as they were undone n 2009, a large inflow was recorded. Over time these currency swaps are designed to sum to zero in BOP terms.
16
17
Endnotes
1. Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
2. Henny Sender, “China to Stick with U.S. Bonds,” FT.com, February 11, 2009.
3. See http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/2008/02/23/the-euro-could-surpass-the-dollar-within%2010-years/.
4. The baseline CBO forecast must assume policies remain as they currently are, which means that temporary spending provisions are assumed
to expire, even if in practice they are often extended. For a discussion of various deficit and debt forecasts, see Alan Auerbach and William Gale,
“Déjà Vu All Over Again: On the Dismal Prospects for the Federal Budget” (Brookings Institution mimeograph, 2010), which notes that the
main concern is not in deficits over the next year or two, but medium- and long-term deficits.
5. Laubach’s analysis is explicitly about five-year projections of deficits (and debt), so one should caution against using it to make statements
about the impact of cyclical deficits. It is more appropriate for longer-term fiscal trends. See Thomas Laubach, “New Evidence on the Interest
Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 858–885.
6. David Malpass, chief economist of Bear Stearns, quoted in “Their Money, Our Strength,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2004.
7. See Francis E Warnock and Veronica Cacdac Warnock, “International Capital Flows and U.S. Interest Rates,” Journal of International Money
and Finance, vol. 28 (2009), pp. 90319.
8. For a more eloquent discussion of salient features of the U.S. Treasury market, see Brian Sack, “Dollar Asset Markets: Prospects after the Crisis,”
remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia, March 26, 2010.
9. See, for example, Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker, “The Blue Bond Proposal,” Bruegel Policy Brief 2010/03.
10. See Sack, “Dollar Asset Markets.”
11. These adjustments, developed by Charles Thomas, Francis E. Warnock, and Jon Wongswan in “The Performance of International Equity
Portfolios” (NBER Working Paper 12346, 2006) and refined by Carol Bertaut and Ralph Tryon in “Monthly Estimates of U.S. Cross-Border
Securities Positions” (FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 910, 2007), are updated each year on http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/ifdp/2007/910/default.htm.
12. The transactions center bias in the TIC data on long-term securities flows derives from the fact that the respondents are asked to identify the
country through which the transaction was made, which can differ from the country of the ultimate buyer (in the case of inflows) or of the issuer
(in the case of outflows). Liabilities data collected on a custodial basis can also have a bias if the custodian and ultimate investor reside in different
countries. To see that the Federal Reserve adjustment is largely a removal of the transaction center bias, note that for Treasury bills, which are
collected by the TIC system on a custodial basis, the discrepancy between TIC and BOP data is quite modest.
13. Note that even with all available information, there is nothing pristine about transactions-based international capital flows data collected for
BOP purposes. A fundamental difficulty with such a data collection system is that it asks reporters to submit data that they would never collect on
their own. A financial intermediary would not naturally care about the residency of the parties on either side of a trade, but that is exactly what
BOP accounting rules ask them to do. More natural might be to obtain higher frequency reads on cross-border positions, something naturally
collected by custodians, and use them to calculate flows.
18
About the Author
Francis E. Warnock is Paul M. Hammaker associate professor of business administration at the Darden
Business School, University of Virginia, research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
senior fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’s Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, and research
associate at Trinity College Dublin’s Institute for International Integration Studies.
Sunday, October 2, 2011
2008 GE12 results
Banner King
2011年1月23日 星期日
2008年马来西亚第12届全国大选最新成绩(国席)
玻璃市：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P1 巴东勿剎 (PADANG BESAR) (国阵巫统) 阿兹米卡立 16,991 57.97 (回教党) 朱卡南 11,643 5,348 674 80.05 36,613
2 P2 加央 (KANGAR) (国阵巫统) 拉西 23,821 68.49 (公正党) 东姑阿都拉曼 10,150 13,671 808 80.17 43,591
3 P3 亚娄 (ARAU) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈拿卡欣 16,451 49.57 (回教党) 哈仑汀 16,151 300 586 83.23 39,877
吉打：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P4 浮罗交怡 (LANGKAWI) (国阵巫统) 阿布峇卡 13,762 59.26 (公正党) 旺沙列 8,792 4,970 670 78.55 29,567
2 P5 尤崙 (JERLUN) (国阵巫统) 慕克力马哈迪 19,424 52.16 (回教党) 依德利斯阿末 17,219 2,205 599 81.83 45,513
3 P6 古邦巴素 (KUBANG PASU) (国阵巫统) 佐哈里 24,179 57.26 (回教党) 依沙依斯迈 17,119 7,060 928 79.19 53,323
4 P7 巴东得腊 (PADANG TERAP) (回教党) 莫哈末纳希 15,003 49.34 (国阵巫统) 卡查里 14,634 369 770 86.00 35,403
5 P8 波各先那 (POKOK SENA) (回教党) 马夫兹 29,687 54.29 (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼依布拉欣 23,956 5,731 1,039 79.44 69,631
6 P9 亚罗士打 (ALOR SETAR) (国阵马华) 曹智雄 20,741 48.17 (公正党) 魏晓隆 20,557 184 1,757 73.28 58,957
7 P10 吉打港口 (KUALA KEDAH) (公正党) 阿末卡欣 35,689 54.28 (国阵巫统) 哈欣耶也 28,671 7,018 1,385 79.08 83,132
8 P11 本同 (PENDANG) (回教党) 莫哈末哈耶迪 27,311 52.99 (国阵巫统) 罗再沙菲岸 23,238 4,073 991 84.19 61,346
9 P12 日莱 (JERAI) (回教党) 莫哈末费道斯 26,510 51.19 (国阵巫统) 峇达鲁丁 24,211 2,299 1,070 78.78 65,739
10 P13 锡 (SIK) (回教党) 仄乌达仄聂 16,864 49.96 (国阵巫统) 奥士曼帝沙 16,383 481 505 86.15 40,339
11 P14 傌莫 (MERBOK) (公正党) 拉昔丁 25,541 51.78 (国阵巫统) 达祖乌鲁斯 22,443 3,098 1,338 77.15 64,443
12 P15 双溪大年 (SUNGAI PETANI) (公正党) 佐哈里阿都 33,822 57.08 (国阵巫统) 再努丁麦丁 24,441 9,381 986 77.84 76,284
13 P16 华玲 (BALING) (回教党) 泰益阿占慕丁 36,074 54.92 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹拉欣 28,461 7,613 1,154 83.74 78,784
14 P17 巴东色海 (PADANG SERAI) (公正党) 哥巴拉克里斯南 28,774 61.13 (国阵马华) 梅振仁 17,036 11,738 1,259 79.58 59,218
15 P18 居林万拉峇鲁 (KULIM-BANDAR BAHARU) (公正党) 朱基菲里诺丁 22,255 55.71 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹 16,672 5,583 1,022 77.28 51,995
吉兰丹：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P19 道北 (TUMPAT) (回教党) 卡玛鲁丁查化 36,714 56.41 (国阵巫统) 阿斯拉夫华迪 27,337 9,377 1,032 81.49 80,072
2 P20 彭加兰吉巴 (PENGKALAN CHEPA) (回教党) 阿都哈林 26,763 62.56 (国阵巫统) 拉欣奥斯曼 15,452 11,311 564 82.23 52,350
3 P21 哥打峇鲁 (KOTA BHARU) (回教党) 旺阿都拉欣 32,129 59.97 (国阵巫统) 法米仄沙列 20,841 11,288 609 78.68 68,261
4 P22 巴西马 (PASIR MAS) (回教党) 依布拉欣阿里 28,673 58.26 (国阵巫统) 罗斯迪玛哈末 19,682 8,991 864 82.74 59,640
5 P23 兰斗班让 (RANTAU PANJANG) (回教党) 茜蒂再拉 19,344 54.69 (国阵巫统) 莫哈末阿芬迪 14,858 4,486 837 78.11 45,384
6 P24 古邦阁亮 (KUBANG KERIAN) (回教党) 沙拉胡丁阿约 27,179 61.28 (国阵巫统) 阿都甘尼玛末 16,537 10,642 638 83.14 53,496
7 P25 万捷 (BACHOK) (回教党) 纳沙鲁丁 28,835 51.88 (国阵巫统) 阿旺阿迪 25,934 2,901 811 85.98 64,808
8 P26 格底里 (KETEREH) (公正党) 阿都阿兹 21,738 49.33 (国阵巫统) 安努亚慕沙 21,338 400 993 84.95 52,240
9 P27 丹那美拉 (TANAH MERAH) (公正党) 安南甘尼 17,554 48.72 (国阵巫统) 沙哈里哈山 15,970 1,584 1,064 81.46 44,347
10 P28 巴西富地 (PASIR PUTEH) (回教党) 莫哈末胡欣 28,365 52.87 (国阵巫统) 安兰末诺 24,397 3,968 886 83.52 64,393
11 P29 马樟 (MACHANG) (公正党) 赛夫丁 21,041 50.86 (国阵巫统) 沙兹米 19,581 1,460 748 84.41 49,157
12 P30 日里 (JELI) (国阵巫统) 慕斯达法 17,168 56.52 (回教党) 莫哈末阿邦迪 12,732 4,436 474 84.18 36,298
13 P31 瓜拉吉赖 (KUALA KRAI) (回教党) 莫哈末哈达南利 23,562 54.93 (国阵巫统) 仄慕沙 18,578 4,984 756 82.32 52,250
14 P32 话望生 (GUA MUSANG) (国阵巫统) 东姑拉沙里 14,063 58.06 (回教党) 祖基菲莫哈末 9,669 4,394 489 83.77 28,986
登嘉楼：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P33 勿述 (BESUT) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉辛 29,376 60.16 (回教党) 胡辛阿旺 18,786 10,590 668 84.49 58,353
2 P34 士兆 (SETIU) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末基汀 26,610 56.83 (回教党) 莫哈末宝兹慕达 19,378 7,232 833 85.88 54,520
3 P35 瓜拉尼鲁斯 (KUALA NERUS) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末纳西依布拉欣 26,439 50.60 (回教党) 慕哈曼苏克里姆 25,098 1,341 713 85.83 61,214
4 P36 瓜拉登嘉楼 (KUALA TERENGGANU) (国阵巫统) 拉查理依斯迈 32,562 49.25 (回教党) 莫哈末沙布 31,934 628 931 82.45 80,325
5 P37 马江 (MARANG) (回教党) 哈迪阿旺 33,435 51.49 (国阵巫统) 阿末兰兹 30,688 2,747 806 86.89 74,813
6 P38 乌鲁登嘉楼 (HULU TERENGGANU) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末诺奥斯曼 27,784 60.64 (回教党) 卡玛鲁查曼阿都拉 17,324 10,460 709 87.54 52,515
7 P39 龙运 (DUNGUN) (国阵巫统) 马督里迪祖索 29,264 53.73 (公正党) 三苏依斯干达尤斯里 24,270 4,994 930 83.98 64,851
8 P40 甘马挽 (KEMAMAN) (国阵巫统) 阿末沙比里 37,199 59.24 (公正党) 法里兹慕沙 24,516 12,683 1,077 83.82 75,006
檳城：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P41 甲拋峇底 (KEPALA BATAS) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉 23,445 64.63 (回教党) 索比利莫哈末亚尔沙 12,199 11,246 634 84.45 43,018
2 P42 打西汝莪 (TASEK GELUGOR) (国阵巫统) 诺莫哈末 20,448 55.34 (回教党) 依斯迈沙烈 15,901 4,547 600 87.98 44,466
3 P43 峇眼 (BAGAN) (行动党) 林冠英 33,748 73.06 (国阵马华) 宋彩苓 11,678 22,070 766 77.84 59,385
4 P44 峇东埔 (PERMATANG PAUH) (公正党) 旺阿兹莎 30,338 64.01 (国阵巫统) 菲道斯 16,950 13,388 110 81.10 58,449
5 P45 大山脚 (BUKIT MERTAJAM) (行动党) 章瑛 37,882 72.51 (国阵马华) 王嵣荃 13,431 24,451 931 79.31 64,080
6 P46 峇都交湾 (BATU KAWAN) (行动党) 拉玛沙米 23,067 61.86 (国阵民政党) 许子根 13,582 9,485 640 78.70 47,378
7 P47 高渊 (NIBONG TEBAL) (公正党) 陈智铭 20,210 53.02 (国阵巫统) 再纳阿比丁 17,123 3,087 784 80.20 47,540
8 P48 升旗山 (BUKIT BENDERA) (行动党) 刘镇东 31,243 66.45 (国阵民政党) 谢宽泰 15,131 16,112 642 72.98 64,545
9 P49 丹绒 (TANJONG) (行动党) 曹观友 28,248 73.11 (国阵民政党) 许文思 9,759 18,489 631 72.80 53,188
10 P50 日落洞 (JELUTONG) (行动党) 黄泉安 30,493 65.77 (国阵民政党) 涂仲仪 14,247 16,246 743 74.56 61,181
11 P51 武吉牛汝莪 (BUKIT GELUGOR) (行动党) 卡巴星 35,140 70.32 (国阵马华) 郭家驊 14,125 21,015 707 76.16 65,614
12 P52 峇央峇鲁 (BAYAN BARU) (公正党) 再林 27,618 61.56 (国阵马华) 黄秀金 16,589 11,029 655 73.90 60,713
13 P53 浮罗山背 (BALIK PULAU) (公正党) 尤斯马尼 15,749 50.17 (国阵巫统) 诺莱莎 15,041 708 601 77.40 39,765
霹靂：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P54 宜力 (GERIK) (国阵民政党) 陈莲花 12,526 62.23 (回教党) 莫哈末诺 6,953 5,573 649 78.13 26,229
2 P55 玲瓏 (LENGGONG) (国阵巫统) 三苏安华 10,992 63.26 (回教党) 莫哈末祖基菲 6,073 4,919 311 75.08 23,223
3 P56 拉律 (LARUT) (国阵巫统) 韩沙查鲁汀 15,878 52.00 (回教党) 莫哈末达里 13,967 1,911 687 77.06 39,697
4 P57 巴里文打 (PARIT BUNTAR) (回教党) 慕加希 21,221 59.76 (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼苏丽曼 13,670 7,551 618 78.71 45,219
5 P58 峇眼色海 (BAGAN SERAI) (公正党) 慕辛法兹利 18,943 53.12 (国阵巫统) 再纳阿比丁辛 15,530 3,413 1,186 76.92 47,111
6 P59 武吉干当 (BUKIT GANTANG) (回教党) 罗斯兰 20,015 49.80 (国阵巫统) 阿欣查比迪 18,449 1,566 851 72.65 55,471
7 P60 太平 (TAIPING) (行动党) 倪可敏 28,098 60.41 (国阵进步党) 卡维斯 16,800 11,298 1,612 71.52 65,889
8 P61 硝山 (PADANG RENGAS) (国阵巫统) 纳兹里 9,830 53.80 (公正党) 阿里亚斯再润 8,081 1,749 362 75.21 24,397
9 P62 和丰 (SUNGAI SIPUT) (公正党) 再也古玛 16,458 49.93 (国阵国大党) 三美威鲁 14,637 1,821 1,001 69.91 47,424
10 P63 打捫 (TAMBUN) (国阵巫统) 阿末胡斯尼 27,942 54.34 (公正党) 莫哈末阿斯里 22,556 5,386 927 75.17 68,966
11 P64 怡保东区 (IPOH TIMOR) (行动党) 林吉祥 37,364 69.85 (国阵马华) 刘文汉 15,422 21,942 707 70.45 76,647
12 P65 怡保西区 (IPOH BARAT) (行动党) 古拉 32,576 64.57 (国阵马华) 易沛鸿 17,042 15,534 829 72.58 69,773
13 P66 华都牙也 (BATU GAJAH) (行动党) 冯宝君 39,922 71.13 (国阵马华) 谢玉权 15,295 24,627 911 72.78 77,313
14 P67 江沙 (KUALA KANGSAR) (国阵巫统) 拉菲达 10,735 52.66 (回教党) 凯鲁丁 9,277 1,458 373 73.34 28,325
15 P68 木威 (BERUAS) (行动党) 倪可汉 15,831 51.53 (国阵民政党) 郑可扬 14,003 1,828 889 71.22 43,273
16 P69 巴力 (PARIT) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末尼沙 12,399 54.98 (回教党) 娜芝哈 9,526 2,873 628 78.30 28,859
17 P70 金宝 (KAMPAR) (国阵马华) 李志亮 20,126 52.14 (行动党) 龚明勋 17,429 2,697 1,048 65.16 59,784
18 P71 务边 (GOPENG) (公正党) 李文材 29,696 55.71 (国阵马华) 林熙隆 22,328 7,368 1,279 71.70 74,344
19 P72 打巴 (TAPAH) (国阵国大党) 沙拉瓦南 14,084 52.53 (公正党) 陈升德 11,064 3,020 1,662 70.12 38,236
20 P73 巴西沙叻 (PASIR SALAK) (国阵巫统) 达祖丁 16,928 52.71 (公正党) 慕斯达化卡米尔 14,240 2,688 950 75.20 42,712
21 P74 红土坎 (LUMUT) (国阵马华) 江作汉 25,698 48.50 (公正党) 苏华迪沙夫万 25,400 298 1,884 72.81 72,766
22 P75 峇眼拿督 (BAGAN DATOK) (国阵巫统) 阿末扎希 13,115 53.86 (公正党) 马兹哈山 10,423 2,692 814 70.42 34,670
23 P76 安顺 (TELUK INTAN) (行动党) 马诺佳能 18,486 50.43 (国阵民政党) 马袖强 17,016 1,470 1,153 70.17 52,354
24 P77 丹绒马林 (TANJONG MALIM) (国阵马华) 黄家泉 21,016 55.37 (公正党) 莫哈末阿兹曼 15,594 5,422 1,344 71.25 53,481
彭亨：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P78 金马崙高原 (CAMERON HIGHLANDS) (国阵国大党) 迪温玛尼 9,164 55.89 (行动党) 亚巴拉三美 6,047 3,117 1,186 70.14 23,461
2 P79 立卑 (LIPIS) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末沙仑 12,611 58.26 (回教党) 莫哈末聂南 8,474 4,137 561 76.55 28,425
3 P80 劳勿 (RAUB) (国阵马华) 黄燕燕 18,078 52.68 (行动党) 阿布巴卡 15,326 2,752 915 74.18 46,454
4 P81 而连突 (JERANTUT) (国阵巫统) 东姑阿兹兰沙 19,543 51.47 (回教党) 韩沙惹化 17,597 1,946 829 78.01 48,812
5 P82 英迪拉马哥打 (INDERA MAHKOTA) (公正党) 阿占依斯迈 19,823 50.43 (国阵巫统) 沙拉蒙阿里 18,796 1,027 688 77.44 51,235
6 P83 关丹 (KUANTAN) (公正党) 傅芝雅 18,398 51.69 (国阵马华) 胡亚桥 16,572 1,826 623 74.92 47,745
7 P84 巴耶勿沙 (PAYA BESAR) (国阵巫统) 拿督阿都马南 19,355 62.75 (公正党) 莫哈末杰菲里 10,852 8,503 637 77.45 39,882
8 P85 北根 (PEKAN) (国阵巫统) 纳吉 36,262 76.63 (公正党) 凯鲁安华 9,798 26,464 1,261 82.23 58,217
9 P86 马兰 (MARAN) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈慕达利 15,868 62.01 (回教党) 纳斯鲁丁 9,227 6,641 495 78.95 32,517
10 P87 瓜拉吉挠 (KUALA KRAU) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈莫哈末赛 16,165 58.69 (回教党) 卡马沙利 10,900 5,265 479 80.83 34,139
11 P88 淡马鲁 (TEMERLOH) (国阵巫统) 赛夫丁 21,381 51.84 (公正党) 阿末尼占 18,940 2,441 924 76.37 54,010
12 P89 文冬 (BENTONG) (国阵马华) 廖中莱 25,134 64.44 (公正党) 波罗沙美 12,585 12,549 1,285 73.01 53,651
13 P90 百乐 (BERA) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈沙比利 18,051 54.59 (回教党) 马兹兰阿利曼 14,230 3,821 783 76.91 42,993
14 P91 云冰 (ROMPIN) (国阵巫统) 贾马鲁丁 21,308 65.04 (回教党) 马兹兰耶欣 10,629 10,679 824 79.04 41,701
雪兰莪：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P92 沙白安南 (SABAK BERNAM) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼 12,055 51.33 (公正党) 峇鲁阿敏 10,720 1,335 711 75.00 31,381
2 P93 大港 (SUNGAI BESAR) (国阵巫统) 诺丽雅 16,069 57.83 (回教党) 奥斯曼沙布朗 11,060 5,009 656 81.69 34,073
3 P94 乌鲁雪兰莪 (ULU SELANGOR) (公正党) 再纳阿比丁 23,177 48.67 (国阵国大党) G.巴拉尼威 22,979 198 1,466 74.89 63,593
4 P95 丹绒加弄 (TANJONG KARANG) (国阵巫统) 诺奥玛 16,073 55.42 (回教党) 莫哈末哈尼巴 12,253 3,820 674 79.83 36,391
5 P96 瓜拉雪兰莪 (KUALA SELANGOR) (回教党) 祖基菲里阿末 18,796 49.96 (国阵巫统) 阿兹再也 17,934 862 894 79.81 47,203
6 P97 士拉央 (SELAYANG) (公正党) 梁自坚 30,701 50.60 (国阵马华) 李丽友 27,134 3,567 1,506 76.57 79,557
7 P98 鹅嘜 (GOMBAK) (公正党) 阿兹敏阿里 40,334 54.05 (国阵巫统) 赛安华 33,467 6,867 820 76.26 99,153
8 P99 安邦 (AMPANG) (公正党) 祖莱达 26,995 52.98 (国阵巫统) 阿兹曼 23,319 3,676 636 73.70 69,132
9 P100 班登 (PANDAN) (国阵马华) 翁诗杰 25,236 52.24 (公正党) 赛沙希尔 22,275 2,961 798 74.90 64,497
10 P101 乌鲁冷岳 (HULU LANGAT) (回教党) 茦罗斯利 36,124 50.24 (国阵巫统) 马基曼 34,379 1,745 1,401 80.02 90,319
11 P102 沙登 (SERDANG) (行动党) 张念群 47,444 62.48 (国阵马华) 何啟利 26,419 21,025 2,072 80.35 94,877
12 P103 蒲种 (PUCHONG) (行动党) 哥宾星 35,079 60.77 (国阵民政党) 卢永平 22,486 12,593 158 78.44 75,625
13 P104 格拉那再也 (KELANA JAYA) (公正党) 罗国本 30,298 51.77 (国阵马华) 李华民 25,267 5,031 1,065 73.61 79,649
14 P105 八打灵再也南区 (PJ SELATAN) (公正党) 许来贤 28,598 54.44 (国阵马华) 林祥才 22,892 5,706 1,044 71.91 73,192
15 P106 八打灵再也北区 (PJ UTARA) (行动党) 潘俭伟 37,851 67.28 (国阵马华) 周美芬 17,879 19,972 527 73.47 76,618
16 P107 梳邦 (SUBANG) (公正党) 西华拉沙 35,024 53.54 (国阵国大党) 慕鲁根山 28,315 6,709 2,079 78.02 84,414
17 P108 沙亚南 (SHAH ALAM) (回教党) 卡利阿都沙末 33,356 57.36 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹三苏汀 24,042 9,314 749 77.47 75,334
18 P109 加埔 (KAPAR) (公正党) 马尼卡瓦沙甘 48,196 55.30 (国阵国大党) 柯玛拉 35,899 12,297 3,064 78.10 112,224
19 P110 巴生 (KLANG) (行动党) 查尔斯圣地亚哥 37,990 64.05 (国阵马华) 庄祷融 20,289 17,701 1,036 76.23 77,816
20 P111 哥打拉惹 (KOTA RAJA) (回教党) 希蒂玛丽亚 38,630 67.39 (国阵国大党) 威尼斯瓦兰 17,879 20,751 814 79.74 71,887
21 P112 瓜拉冷岳 (KUALA LANGAT) (公正党) 阿都拉沙尼 26,687 50.55 (国阵巫统) 哈芝苏莱曼 25,698 989 407 79.37 66,515
22 P113 雪邦 (SEPANG) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末欣 26,381 53.83 (回教党) 莫哈末玛奇 21,532 4,849 1,099 79.20 62,044
吉隆坡联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P114 甲洞 (KEPONG) (行动党) 陈胜尧 35,552 74.90 (国阵民政党) 刘开强 11,704 23,848 212 78.10 60,775
2 P115 峇都 (BATU) (公正党) 蔡添强 29,785 58.71 (国阵民政党) 林时彬 20,330 9,455 614 72.72 70,544
3 P116 旺沙马朱 (WANGSA MAJU) (公正党) 黄朱强 19,637 49.74 (国阵马华) 姚长禄 19,487 150 357 73.01 54,509
4 P117 泗岩沫 (SEGAMBUT) (行动党) 林立迎 25,046 58.38 (国阵民政党) 马伟祺 17,314 7,732 541 72.93 59,690
5 P118 斯迪亚旺沙 (SETIAWANGSA) (国阵巫统) 朱哈斯南 25,489 58.24 (公正党) 依布拉欣 17,355 8,134 918 76.56 57,161
6 P119 帝帝皇沙 (TITIWANGSA) (回教党) 洛洛莫哈末卡扎里 17,857 52.62 (国阵巫统) 阿兹加马鲁丁 15,885 1,972 191 68.01 49,892
7 P120 武吉免登 (BUKIT BINTANG) (行动党) 方贵伦 26,811 67.35 (国阵马华) 李崇孟 12,534 14,277 466 66.37 59,986
8 P121 班底谷 (LEMBAH PANTAI) (公正党) 努鲁依莎 21,728 52.62 (国阵巫统) 莎丽扎 18,833 2,895 239 72.88 56,650
9 P122 士布爹 (SEPUTEH) (行动党) 郭素沁 47,230 81.23 (国阵马华) 周紫琳 10,738 36,492 174 75.70 76,891
10 P123 蕉赖 (CHERAS) (行动党) 陈国伟 39,253 77.81 (国阵马华) 吴心一 10,953 28,300 244 73.58 68,725
11 P124 敦拉萨镇 (BANDAR TUN RAZAK) (公正党) 卡立依布拉欣 28,123 51.66 (国阵马华) 陈财和 25,608 2,515 707 75.72 72,628
布城联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P125 布城 (PUTRAJAYA) (国阵巫统) 东姑安南 4,038 75.06 (回教党) 莫哈末诺 1,304 2,734 38 81.96 6,608
森美兰：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P126 日叻务 (JELEBU) (国阵巫统) 莱士雅丁 19,737 68.93 (回教党) 诺曼依彬 8,127 11,610 769 75.05 38,682
2 P127 仁保 (JEMPOL) (国阵巫统) 利拉耶辛 25,294 64.33 (回教党) 茜蒂玛丽亚 12,974 12,320 1,054 73.53 53,478
3 P128 芙蓉 (SEREMBAN) (行动党) 约翰费南迪 32,970 51.32 (国阵马华) 尤绰韜 29,022 3,948 2,248 76.10 84,675
4 P129 瓜拉庇劳 (KUALA PILAH) (国阵巫统) 哈山马力 20,417 64.34 (公正党) 安华莫哈末沙烈 10,409 10,008 908 74.79 42,328
5 P130 亚沙 (RASAH) (行动党) 陆兆福 34,271 60.49 (国阵马华) 姚再添 21,120 13,151 1,261 78.56 72,115
6 P131 林茂 (REMBAU) (国阵巫统) 凯里 26,525 54.82 (公正党) 巴都鲁希山 20,779 5,746 1,086 77.75 62,896
7 P132 直落甘望 (TELOK KEMANG) (公正党) 卡玛鲁巴哈林 23,348 50.99 (国阵国大党) 索迪纳登 20,544 2,804 1,299 77.45 60,186
8 P133 淡边 (TAMPIN) (国阵巫统) 沙兹曼 24,022 66.58 (回教党) 拉查吉 10,943 13,079 1,115 76.24 47,655
马六甲：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P134 马日丹那 (MASJID TANAH) (国阵巫统) 阿布瑟曼尤索夫 21,582 68.31 (回教党) 阿都甘尼 9,297 12,285 717 78.10 40,606
2 P135 亚罗牙也 (ALOR GAJAH) (国阵马华) 冯镇安 26,354 63.08 (行动党) 陈丽香 13,470 12,884 1,953 77.37 54,097
3 P136 冬牙峇株 (TANGGA BATU) (国阵巫统) 伊德利斯哈仑 30,460 61.32 (公正党) 再农嘉化 15,960 14,500 3,255 82.53 60,188
4 P137 武吉卡迪 (BUKIT KATIL) (国阵巫统) 末西蜡阿布 30,975 50.48 (公正党) 卡立耶化 29,217 1,758 1,173 81.92 75,777
5 P138 马六甲市区 (KOTA MELAKA) (行动党) 沉同钦 38,640 57.38 (国阵马华) 王乃志 27,250 11,390 1,448 79.57 84,805
6 P139 野新 (JASIN) (国阵巫统) 阿末韩查 27,838 63.02 (公正党) 祖吉菲礼 15,348 12,490 990 78.72 56,121
柔佛：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P140 昔加末 (SEGAMAT) (国阵国大党) 苏巴马廉 15,921 53.61 (行动党) 彭学良 12,930 2,991 847 72.96 40,708
2 P141 士基央 (SEKIJANG) (国阵巫统) 巴哈仑 17,979 67.30 (公正党) 祖基菲沙烈 8,112 9,867 622 76.03 35,138
3 P142 拉美士 (LABIS) (国阵马华) 蔡智勇 13,658 56.82 (行动党) 张颖群 9,564 4,094 816 71.95 33,468
4 P143 巴莪 (PAGOH) (国阵巫统) 慕尤丁 21,028 69.49 (回教党) 莫哈末罗查礼 8,447 12,581 787 75.70 40,042
5 P144 礼让 (LEDANG) (国阵巫统) 哈敏 25,319 56.96 (公正党) 刘德海 17,702 7,617 1,433 75.99 58,501
6 P145 峇吉里 (BAKRI) (行动党) 余德华 21,051 49.02 (国阵马华) 郑贝川 20,329 722 1,561 76.55 56,372
7 P146 麻坡 (MUAR) (国阵巫统) 拉查里 16,986 56.22 (公正党) 娜布汀 12,325 4,661 902 73.81 41,019
8 P147 巴力士隆 (PARIT SULONG) (国阵巫统) 诺莱妮 26,066 65.88 (回教党) 费沙阿里 12,467 13,599 1,033 78.91 50,234
9 P148 亚依淡 (AYER HITAM) (国阵马华) 魏家祥 20,230 73.68 (回教党) 胡申苏嘉 6,321 13,909 907 78.98 34,805
10 P149 四加亭 (SRI GADING) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末阿兹士 19,641 67.39 (公正党) 阿里玛贡 8,767 10,874 738 79.43 36,845
11 P150 峇株巴辖 (BATU PAHAT) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末卜艾 32,461 60.13 (公正党) 莫哈末阿都拉 19,757 12,704 1,768 77.21 70,069
12 P151 新邦令金 (SIMPANG RENGGAM) (国阵民政党) 梁德明 16,450 63.34 (回教党) 阿丹贡邦 8,597 7,853 924 74.58 34,859
13 P152 居鑾 (KLUANG) (国阵马华) 何国忠 27,970 51.76 (行动党) 黄南华 24,189 3,781 1,884 76.60 71,233
14 P153 森波浪 (SEMBRONG) (国阵巫统) 希山慕丁 17,988 71.54 (公正党) 李尚 6,418 11,570 739 75.98 33,181
15 P154 丰盛港 (MERSING) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉迪夫 20,116 73.54 (回教党) 沙哈尔阿都拉 6,380 13,736 857 75.59 36,445
16 P155 东南镇 (TENGGARA) (国阵巫统) 哈丽玛 19,031 75.08 (回教党) 沙烈法敏 4,982 14,049 1,336 78.49 32,297
17 P156 哥打丁宜 (KOTA TINGGI) (国阵巫统) 赛哈密 22,682 83.83 (回教党) 翁嘉化 3,721 18,961 653 79.29 34,190
18 P157 边佳兰 (PENGERANG) (国阵巫统) 阿莎丽娜 不战而胜 33,002
19 P158 地不佬 (TEBRAU) (国阵马华) 邓文村 30,860 63.51 (回教党) 罗斯来尼 16,202 14,658 1,525 77.73 62,505
20 P159 巴西古当 (PASIR GUDANG) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末卡立 35,849 64.44 (公正党) 末尼占莫哈末沙曼 18,568 17,281 1,211 76.71 72,862
21 P160 新山 (JOHOR BAHRU) (国阵巫统) 沙里尔 43,143 69.22 (人民党) 哈山卡林 17,794 25,349 1,391 69.59 89,725
22 P161 埔来 (PULAI) (国阵巫统) 诺加兹兰 38,036 67.08 (回教党) 阿都拉 17,587 20,449 1,079 71.42 79,622
23 P162 振林山 (GELANG PATAH) (国阵马华) 曾亚英 33,630 55.45 (公正党) 查丽哈 24,779 8,851 2,244 77.19 78,676
24 P163 古来 (KULAI) (国阵马华) 黄家定 32,017 59.71 (行动党) 吴柏松 20,273 11,744 1,327 79.69 67,358
25 P164 笨珍 (PONTIAN) (国阵巫统) 阿末玛士兰 23,121 70.48 (公正党) 莫哈末安努亚 8,677 14,444 1,008 75.83 43,264
26 P165 丹绒比艾 (TANJONG PIAI) (国阵马华) 黄日升 23,302 65.92 (行动党) 阿末顿 10,931 12,371 1,117 77.35 45,701
纳闽联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P166 纳闽 (LABUAN) (国阵巫统) 尤索夫玛哈 10,471 75.32 (独立人士) 刘成吉 2,014 8,457 311 68.08 20,783
沙巴：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P167 古达 (KUDAT) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉欣巴克里 17,634 66.72 (公正党) 耶也奥曼 7,739 9,895 1,058 66.98 39,643
2 P168 马鲁都 (KOTA MARUDU) (国阵团结党) 麦西慕 12,028 54.25 (公正党) 安东尼曼帝奥 7,830 4,198 748 69.51 31,938
3 P169 哥打毛律 (KOTA BELUD) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼达兰 17,842 52.93 (公正党) 沙依帝西莫依 14,822 3,020 1,046 78.27 43,071
4 P170 斗亚兰 (TUARAN) (国阵民统) 威弗烈邦布琳 17,645 57.80 (公正党) 安沙里阿都拉 11,023 6,622 979 74.89 40,761
5 P171 昔邦加 (SEPANGGAR) (国阵沙进步党) 依力马贞文 16,884 62.99 (公正党) 莫哈末依巴拉欣 5,423 11,461 790 68.76 39,251
6 P172 亚庇 (KOTA KINABALU) (行动党) 邱庆洲 9,464 33.89 (公正党) 刘静芝 9,358 106 340 64.09 43,714
7 P173 布达丹 (PUTATAN) (国阵民统) 马京马古斯莫吉高 13,737 60.90 (公正党) 少吉那尤索夫 7,292 6,445 608 66.68 34,935
8 P174 兵南邦 (PENAMPANG) (国阵民统) 柏纳东博 13,400 52.80 (公正党) 爱尔文波西 10,337 3,063 540 70.84 35,821
9 P175 吧巴 (PAPAR) (国阵巫统) 罗丝娜拉西 15,352 62.72 (公正党) 瓦合依德利斯 5,778 9,574 651 75.84 32,276
10 P176 金马利 (KIMANIS) (国阵巫统) 阿尼法阿曼 10,242 59.03 (独立人士) 查阿法依斯迈 4,789 5,453 500 78.09 22,239
11 P177 保佛 (BEAUFORT) (国阵巫统) 拉京奥津 14,780 76.47 (公正党) 拉津尤索夫 3,866 10,914 681 72.22 26,788
12 P178 实必丹 (SIPITANG) (国阵巫统) 沙巴威阿末 11,905 65.43 (公正党) 卡林达欣 5,759 6,146 531 75.00 24,145
13 P179 兰瑙 (RANAU) (国阵民统) 系林安古巴 14,074 63.49 (公正党) 佐纳丹耶辛 6,823 7,251 653 72.06 30,810
14 P180 根地咬 (KENINGAU) (国阵团结党) 拜林吉丁岸 14,958 56.84 (公正党) 杰菲里吉丁岸 10,334 4,624 464 73.97 35,578
15 P181 丹南 (TENOM) (国阵巫统) 莱米翁吉 9,535 60.76 (公正党) 安德利斯达利宾 2,652 6,883 523 75.20 20,874
16 P182 冰厢岸 (PENSIANGAN) (国阵人民团结) 佐瑟古律 不战而胜 19,712
17 P183 柏鲁兰 (BELURAN) (国阵巫统) 罗纳建迪 7,090 57.58 (独立人士) 兰沙达欣 2,738 4,352 468 64.00 19,181
18 P184 里巴兰 (LIBARAN) (国阵巫统) 朱斯里阿基罗 13,668 66.93 (公正党) 阿末丹林再尼 6,139 7,529 613 65.33 31,435
19 P185 巴都沙比 (BATU SAPI) (国阵团结党) 蒋国华 9,479 59.32 (独立人士) 钟广维 5,771 3,708 730 63.06 26,004
20 P186 山打根 (SANDAKAN) (国阵自民党) 刘伟强 8,297 41.50 (行动党) 章翠玲 8,121 176 644 61.00 32,847
21 P187 京那巴丹岸 (KINABATANGAN) (国阵巫统) 邦莫达拉丁 8,507 66.50 (公正党) 阿末阿都 2,181 6,326 589 66.00 19,554
22 P188 诗南 (SILAM) (国阵巫统) 沙礼卡比 18,111 66.05 (公正党) 哈斯布拉奥亨 8,319 9,792 989 63.37 43,488
23 P189 仙本那 (SEMPORNA) (国阵巫统) 沙菲益阿达 19,419 87.44 (公正党) 阿基斯阿都哈密 1,957 17,462 832 63.07 35,216
24 P190 斗湖 (TAWAU) (国阵沙进步党) 蔡顺梅 13,943 51.58 (行动党) 陈泓縑 9,076 4,867 735 63.52 42,560
25 P191 加拉巴干 (KALABAKAN) (国阵巫统) 阿都嘉夫 不战而胜 36,018
砂拉越：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P192 玛士加汀 (MAS GADING) (国阵民进党) 迪奇拉菲 8,551 57.89 (国民党) 巴岛鲁必士 4,250 4,301 188 67.37 21,968
2 P193 山都望 (SANTUBONG) (国阵土保党) 旺朱乃迪 15,800 79.39 (公正党) 拉末艾迪尔 3,855 11,945 248 64.73 30,836
3 P194 柏特拉再也 (PETRA JAYA) (国阵土保党) 法迪拉 19,515 78.39 (公正党) 莫哈末佐希 5,118 14,397 263 61.74 40,533
4 P195 古晋 (BANDAR KUCHING) (行动党) 张健仁 22,901 63.45 (国阵人联党) 沉耀荣 12,949 9,952 242 68.13 53,216
5 P196 实旦宾 (STAMPIN) (国阵人联党) 杨昆贤 21,966 50.51 (行动党) 温利山 18,896 3,070 428 65.31 67,257
6 P197 哥打三马拉汉 (KOTA SAMARAHAN) (国阵土保党) 苏莱曼泰益 15,559 72.61 (公正党) 胡先阿波 4,148 11,411 823 75.14 28,517
7 P198 曼旺 (MAMBONG) (国阵土保党) 詹姆士达弗 14,182 63.94 (公正党) 玛仁邦约 7,525 6,657 473 61.71 36,147
8 P199 西连 (SERIAN) (国阵人联党) 里察烈 15,793 85.41 (国民党) 柏拉勇阿纳查央 2,366 13,427 332 66.36 27,901
9 P200 峇丹砂隆 (BATANG SADONG) (国阵土保党) 南茜苏克利 8,183 73.65 (公正党) 毕依琳 2,758 5,425 170 66.21 16,794
10 P201 峇丹鲁巴 (BATANG LUPAR) (国阵土保党) 罗哈妮 11,015 76.59 (回教党) 阿邦依迪 2,923 8,092 193 64.21 22,417
11 P202 斯里阿曼 (SRI AMAN) (国阵砂人民党) 玛瑟古札 9,700 63.16 (独立人士) 古波阿纳鲁西 5,448 4,252 211 59.70 25,724
12 P203 鲁勃安都 (LUBOK ANTU) (国阵砂人民党) 威廉雅劳 6,769 56.28 (独立人士) 尼克拉斯巴威尔 5,159 1,610 99 69.97 17,190
13 P204 木中 (BETONG) (国阵土保党) 道格拉斯 13,708 85.93 (国民党) 史登里朱戈 1,999 11,709 246 72.22 22,088
14 P205 砂拉卓 (SARATOK) (国阵民进党) 惹拉因末萨 12,470 75.80 (公正党) 莫哈末耶也 3,764 8,706 218 68.66 23,982
15 P206 丹绒玛尼斯 (TANJONGＭANIS) (国阵土保党) 诺拉阿都拉曼 不战而胜 17,052
16 P207 伊干 (IGAN) (国阵土保党) 瓦合杜拉 不战而胜 15,735
17 P208 泗里街 (SARIKEI) (国阵人联党) 陈冠勋 10,588 47.98 (行动党) 黄华西 10,537 51 176 69.68 31,675
18 P209 如楼 (JULAU) (国阵砂人民党) 佐瑟沙朗 10,351 77.83 (公正党) 安布鲁斯拉邦 2,767 7,584 182 65.50 20,306
19 P210 加拿逸 (KANOWIT) (国阵砂人民党) 艾伦达干 不战而胜 17,613
20 P211 南兰 (LANANG) (国阵人联党) 张泰卿 19,476 56.71 (行动党) 黄培根 14,612 4,864 253 69.54 49,530
21 P212 诗巫 (SIBU) (国阵人联党) 刘会洲 19,138 52.61 (行动党) 黄和联 15,903 3,235 526 67.77 53,679
22 P213 沐胶 (MUKAH) (国阵土保党) 廖迈克 10,090 70.05 (独立人士) 海宾玛拉威因 3,792 6,298 521 63.17 22,851
23 P214 实兰沟 (SELANGAU) (国阵砂人民党) 佐瑟恩都鲁 不战而胜 20,057
24 P215 加帛 (KAPIT) (国阵土保党) 阿歷山大南达林奇 不战而胜 22,723
25 P216 乌鲁拉让 (HULU RAJANG) (国阵砂人民党) 比利阿必佐 6,590 59.08 (独立人士) 乔治拉贡 4,426 2,164 139 63.09 17,696
26 P217 民都鲁 (BINTULU) (国阵民进党) 张庆信 23,628 72.53 (行动党) 林素均 8,663 14,965 288 64.98 50,404
27 P218 实务地 (SIBUTI) (国阵土保党) 阿末莱 8,238 63.27 (公正党) 张有庆 4,590 3,648 192 58.84 22,143
28 P219 美里 (MIRI) (国阵人联党) 陈华贵 19,354 57.32 (行动党) 房保德 14,138 5,216 273 60.70 55,963
29 P220 峇南 (BARAM) (国阵民进党) 耶谷沙岸 7,996 66.00 (独立人士) 哥宾旺 3,952 4,044 167 49.65 24,425
30 P221 林梦 (LIMBANG) (国阵土保党) 哈斯比哈比波拉 6,427 52.29 (公正党) 刘烈贵 5,751 676 113 60.94 20,315
31 P222 老越 (LAWAS) (国阵土保党) 亨利宋艾贡 8,526 91.27 (公正党) 查巴苏友 734 7,792 82 59.44 15,717
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2008年马来西亚第12届全国大选最新成绩(国席)
玻璃市：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P1 巴东勿剎 (PADANG BESAR) (国阵巫统) 阿兹米卡立 16,991 57.97 (回教党) 朱卡南 11,643 5,348 674 80.05 36,613
2 P2 加央 (KANGAR) (国阵巫统) 拉西 23,821 68.49 (公正党) 东姑阿都拉曼 10,150 13,671 808 80.17 43,591
3 P3 亚娄 (ARAU) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈拿卡欣 16,451 49.57 (回教党) 哈仑汀 16,151 300 586 83.23 39,877
吉打：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P4 浮罗交怡 (LANGKAWI) (国阵巫统) 阿布峇卡 13,762 59.26 (公正党) 旺沙列 8,792 4,970 670 78.55 29,567
2 P5 尤崙 (JERLUN) (国阵巫统) 慕克力马哈迪 19,424 52.16 (回教党) 依德利斯阿末 17,219 2,205 599 81.83 45,513
3 P6 古邦巴素 (KUBANG PASU) (国阵巫统) 佐哈里 24,179 57.26 (回教党) 依沙依斯迈 17,119 7,060 928 79.19 53,323
4 P7 巴东得腊 (PADANG TERAP) (回教党) 莫哈末纳希 15,003 49.34 (国阵巫统) 卡查里 14,634 369 770 86.00 35,403
5 P8 波各先那 (POKOK SENA) (回教党) 马夫兹 29,687 54.29 (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼依布拉欣 23,956 5,731 1,039 79.44 69,631
6 P9 亚罗士打 (ALOR SETAR) (国阵马华) 曹智雄 20,741 48.17 (公正党) 魏晓隆 20,557 184 1,757 73.28 58,957
7 P10 吉打港口 (KUALA KEDAH) (公正党) 阿末卡欣 35,689 54.28 (国阵巫统) 哈欣耶也 28,671 7,018 1,385 79.08 83,132
8 P11 本同 (PENDANG) (回教党) 莫哈末哈耶迪 27,311 52.99 (国阵巫统) 罗再沙菲岸 23,238 4,073 991 84.19 61,346
9 P12 日莱 (JERAI) (回教党) 莫哈末费道斯 26,510 51.19 (国阵巫统) 峇达鲁丁 24,211 2,299 1,070 78.78 65,739
10 P13 锡 (SIK) (回教党) 仄乌达仄聂 16,864 49.96 (国阵巫统) 奥士曼帝沙 16,383 481 505 86.15 40,339
11 P14 傌莫 (MERBOK) (公正党) 拉昔丁 25,541 51.78 (国阵巫统) 达祖乌鲁斯 22,443 3,098 1,338 77.15 64,443
12 P15 双溪大年 (SUNGAI PETANI) (公正党) 佐哈里阿都 33,822 57.08 (国阵巫统) 再努丁麦丁 24,441 9,381 986 77.84 76,284
13 P16 华玲 (BALING) (回教党) 泰益阿占慕丁 36,074 54.92 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹拉欣 28,461 7,613 1,154 83.74 78,784
14 P17 巴东色海 (PADANG SERAI) (公正党) 哥巴拉克里斯南 28,774 61.13 (国阵马华) 梅振仁 17,036 11,738 1,259 79.58 59,218
15 P18 居林万拉峇鲁 (KULIM-BANDAR BAHARU) (公正党) 朱基菲里诺丁 22,255 55.71 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹 16,672 5,583 1,022 77.28 51,995
吉兰丹：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P19 道北 (TUMPAT) (回教党) 卡玛鲁丁查化 36,714 56.41 (国阵巫统) 阿斯拉夫华迪 27,337 9,377 1,032 81.49 80,072
2 P20 彭加兰吉巴 (PENGKALAN CHEPA) (回教党) 阿都哈林 26,763 62.56 (国阵巫统) 拉欣奥斯曼 15,452 11,311 564 82.23 52,350
3 P21 哥打峇鲁 (KOTA BHARU) (回教党) 旺阿都拉欣 32,129 59.97 (国阵巫统) 法米仄沙列 20,841 11,288 609 78.68 68,261
4 P22 巴西马 (PASIR MAS) (回教党) 依布拉欣阿里 28,673 58.26 (国阵巫统) 罗斯迪玛哈末 19,682 8,991 864 82.74 59,640
5 P23 兰斗班让 (RANTAU PANJANG) (回教党) 茜蒂再拉 19,344 54.69 (国阵巫统) 莫哈末阿芬迪 14,858 4,486 837 78.11 45,384
6 P24 古邦阁亮 (KUBANG KERIAN) (回教党) 沙拉胡丁阿约 27,179 61.28 (国阵巫统) 阿都甘尼玛末 16,537 10,642 638 83.14 53,496
7 P25 万捷 (BACHOK) (回教党) 纳沙鲁丁 28,835 51.88 (国阵巫统) 阿旺阿迪 25,934 2,901 811 85.98 64,808
8 P26 格底里 (KETEREH) (公正党) 阿都阿兹 21,738 49.33 (国阵巫统) 安努亚慕沙 21,338 400 993 84.95 52,240
9 P27 丹那美拉 (TANAH MERAH) (公正党) 安南甘尼 17,554 48.72 (国阵巫统) 沙哈里哈山 15,970 1,584 1,064 81.46 44,347
10 P28 巴西富地 (PASIR PUTEH) (回教党) 莫哈末胡欣 28,365 52.87 (国阵巫统) 安兰末诺 24,397 3,968 886 83.52 64,393
11 P29 马樟 (MACHANG) (公正党) 赛夫丁 21,041 50.86 (国阵巫统) 沙兹米 19,581 1,460 748 84.41 49,157
12 P30 日里 (JELI) (国阵巫统) 慕斯达法 17,168 56.52 (回教党) 莫哈末阿邦迪 12,732 4,436 474 84.18 36,298
13 P31 瓜拉吉赖 (KUALA KRAI) (回教党) 莫哈末哈达南利 23,562 54.93 (国阵巫统) 仄慕沙 18,578 4,984 756 82.32 52,250
14 P32 话望生 (GUA MUSANG) (国阵巫统) 东姑拉沙里 14,063 58.06 (回教党) 祖基菲莫哈末 9,669 4,394 489 83.77 28,986
登嘉楼：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P33 勿述 (BESUT) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉辛 29,376 60.16 (回教党) 胡辛阿旺 18,786 10,590 668 84.49 58,353
2 P34 士兆 (SETIU) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末基汀 26,610 56.83 (回教党) 莫哈末宝兹慕达 19,378 7,232 833 85.88 54,520
3 P35 瓜拉尼鲁斯 (KUALA NERUS) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末纳西依布拉欣 26,439 50.60 (回教党) 慕哈曼苏克里姆 25,098 1,341 713 85.83 61,214
4 P36 瓜拉登嘉楼 (KUALA TERENGGANU) (国阵巫统) 拉查理依斯迈 32,562 49.25 (回教党) 莫哈末沙布 31,934 628 931 82.45 80,325
5 P37 马江 (MARANG) (回教党) 哈迪阿旺 33,435 51.49 (国阵巫统) 阿末兰兹 30,688 2,747 806 86.89 74,813
6 P38 乌鲁登嘉楼 (HULU TERENGGANU) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末诺奥斯曼 27,784 60.64 (回教党) 卡玛鲁查曼阿都拉 17,324 10,460 709 87.54 52,515
7 P39 龙运 (DUNGUN) (国阵巫统) 马督里迪祖索 29,264 53.73 (公正党) 三苏依斯干达尤斯里 24,270 4,994 930 83.98 64,851
8 P40 甘马挽 (KEMAMAN) (国阵巫统) 阿末沙比里 37,199 59.24 (公正党) 法里兹慕沙 24,516 12,683 1,077 83.82 75,006
檳城：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P41 甲拋峇底 (KEPALA BATAS) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉 23,445 64.63 (回教党) 索比利莫哈末亚尔沙 12,199 11,246 634 84.45 43,018
2 P42 打西汝莪 (TASEK GELUGOR) (国阵巫统) 诺莫哈末 20,448 55.34 (回教党) 依斯迈沙烈 15,901 4,547 600 87.98 44,466
3 P43 峇眼 (BAGAN) (行动党) 林冠英 33,748 73.06 (国阵马华) 宋彩苓 11,678 22,070 766 77.84 59,385
4 P44 峇东埔 (PERMATANG PAUH) (公正党) 旺阿兹莎 30,338 64.01 (国阵巫统) 菲道斯 16,950 13,388 110 81.10 58,449
5 P45 大山脚 (BUKIT MERTAJAM) (行动党) 章瑛 37,882 72.51 (国阵马华) 王嵣荃 13,431 24,451 931 79.31 64,080
6 P46 峇都交湾 (BATU KAWAN) (行动党) 拉玛沙米 23,067 61.86 (国阵民政党) 许子根 13,582 9,485 640 78.70 47,378
7 P47 高渊 (NIBONG TEBAL) (公正党) 陈智铭 20,210 53.02 (国阵巫统) 再纳阿比丁 17,123 3,087 784 80.20 47,540
8 P48 升旗山 (BUKIT BENDERA) (行动党) 刘镇东 31,243 66.45 (国阵民政党) 谢宽泰 15,131 16,112 642 72.98 64,545
9 P49 丹绒 (TANJONG) (行动党) 曹观友 28,248 73.11 (国阵民政党) 许文思 9,759 18,489 631 72.80 53,188
10 P50 日落洞 (JELUTONG) (行动党) 黄泉安 30,493 65.77 (国阵民政党) 涂仲仪 14,247 16,246 743 74.56 61,181
11 P51 武吉牛汝莪 (BUKIT GELUGOR) (行动党) 卡巴星 35,140 70.32 (国阵马华) 郭家驊 14,125 21,015 707 76.16 65,614
12 P52 峇央峇鲁 (BAYAN BARU) (公正党) 再林 27,618 61.56 (国阵马华) 黄秀金 16,589 11,029 655 73.90 60,713
13 P53 浮罗山背 (BALIK PULAU) (公正党) 尤斯马尼 15,749 50.17 (国阵巫统) 诺莱莎 15,041 708 601 77.40 39,765
霹靂：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P54 宜力 (GERIK) (国阵民政党) 陈莲花 12,526 62.23 (回教党) 莫哈末诺 6,953 5,573 649 78.13 26,229
2 P55 玲瓏 (LENGGONG) (国阵巫统) 三苏安华 10,992 63.26 (回教党) 莫哈末祖基菲 6,073 4,919 311 75.08 23,223
3 P56 拉律 (LARUT) (国阵巫统) 韩沙查鲁汀 15,878 52.00 (回教党) 莫哈末达里 13,967 1,911 687 77.06 39,697
4 P57 巴里文打 (PARIT BUNTAR) (回教党) 慕加希 21,221 59.76 (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼苏丽曼 13,670 7,551 618 78.71 45,219
5 P58 峇眼色海 (BAGAN SERAI) (公正党) 慕辛法兹利 18,943 53.12 (国阵巫统) 再纳阿比丁辛 15,530 3,413 1,186 76.92 47,111
6 P59 武吉干当 (BUKIT GANTANG) (回教党) 罗斯兰 20,015 49.80 (国阵巫统) 阿欣查比迪 18,449 1,566 851 72.65 55,471
7 P60 太平 (TAIPING) (行动党) 倪可敏 28,098 60.41 (国阵进步党) 卡维斯 16,800 11,298 1,612 71.52 65,889
8 P61 硝山 (PADANG RENGAS) (国阵巫统) 纳兹里 9,830 53.80 (公正党) 阿里亚斯再润 8,081 1,749 362 75.21 24,397
9 P62 和丰 (SUNGAI SIPUT) (公正党) 再也古玛 16,458 49.93 (国阵国大党) 三美威鲁 14,637 1,821 1,001 69.91 47,424
10 P63 打捫 (TAMBUN) (国阵巫统) 阿末胡斯尼 27,942 54.34 (公正党) 莫哈末阿斯里 22,556 5,386 927 75.17 68,966
11 P64 怡保东区 (IPOH TIMOR) (行动党) 林吉祥 37,364 69.85 (国阵马华) 刘文汉 15,422 21,942 707 70.45 76,647
12 P65 怡保西区 (IPOH BARAT) (行动党) 古拉 32,576 64.57 (国阵马华) 易沛鸿 17,042 15,534 829 72.58 69,773
13 P66 华都牙也 (BATU GAJAH) (行动党) 冯宝君 39,922 71.13 (国阵马华) 谢玉权 15,295 24,627 911 72.78 77,313
14 P67 江沙 (KUALA KANGSAR) (国阵巫统) 拉菲达 10,735 52.66 (回教党) 凯鲁丁 9,277 1,458 373 73.34 28,325
15 P68 木威 (BERUAS) (行动党) 倪可汉 15,831 51.53 (国阵民政党) 郑可扬 14,003 1,828 889 71.22 43,273
16 P69 巴力 (PARIT) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末尼沙 12,399 54.98 (回教党) 娜芝哈 9,526 2,873 628 78.30 28,859
17 P70 金宝 (KAMPAR) (国阵马华) 李志亮 20,126 52.14 (行动党) 龚明勋 17,429 2,697 1,048 65.16 59,784
18 P71 务边 (GOPENG) (公正党) 李文材 29,696 55.71 (国阵马华) 林熙隆 22,328 7,368 1,279 71.70 74,344
19 P72 打巴 (TAPAH) (国阵国大党) 沙拉瓦南 14,084 52.53 (公正党) 陈升德 11,064 3,020 1,662 70.12 38,236
20 P73 巴西沙叻 (PASIR SALAK) (国阵巫统) 达祖丁 16,928 52.71 (公正党) 慕斯达化卡米尔 14,240 2,688 950 75.20 42,712
21 P74 红土坎 (LUMUT) (国阵马华) 江作汉 25,698 48.50 (公正党) 苏华迪沙夫万 25,400 298 1,884 72.81 72,766
22 P75 峇眼拿督 (BAGAN DATOK) (国阵巫统) 阿末扎希 13,115 53.86 (公正党) 马兹哈山 10,423 2,692 814 70.42 34,670
23 P76 安顺 (TELUK INTAN) (行动党) 马诺佳能 18,486 50.43 (国阵民政党) 马袖强 17,016 1,470 1,153 70.17 52,354
24 P77 丹绒马林 (TANJONG MALIM) (国阵马华) 黄家泉 21,016 55.37 (公正党) 莫哈末阿兹曼 15,594 5,422 1,344 71.25 53,481
彭亨：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P78 金马崙高原 (CAMERON HIGHLANDS) (国阵国大党) 迪温玛尼 9,164 55.89 (行动党) 亚巴拉三美 6,047 3,117 1,186 70.14 23,461
2 P79 立卑 (LIPIS) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末沙仑 12,611 58.26 (回教党) 莫哈末聂南 8,474 4,137 561 76.55 28,425
3 P80 劳勿 (RAUB) (国阵马华) 黄燕燕 18,078 52.68 (行动党) 阿布巴卡 15,326 2,752 915 74.18 46,454
4 P81 而连突 (JERANTUT) (国阵巫统) 东姑阿兹兰沙 19,543 51.47 (回教党) 韩沙惹化 17,597 1,946 829 78.01 48,812
5 P82 英迪拉马哥打 (INDERA MAHKOTA) (公正党) 阿占依斯迈 19,823 50.43 (国阵巫统) 沙拉蒙阿里 18,796 1,027 688 77.44 51,235
6 P83 关丹 (KUANTAN) (公正党) 傅芝雅 18,398 51.69 (国阵马华) 胡亚桥 16,572 1,826 623 74.92 47,745
7 P84 巴耶勿沙 (PAYA BESAR) (国阵巫统) 拿督阿都马南 19,355 62.75 (公正党) 莫哈末杰菲里 10,852 8,503 637 77.45 39,882
8 P85 北根 (PEKAN) (国阵巫统) 纳吉 36,262 76.63 (公正党) 凯鲁安华 9,798 26,464 1,261 82.23 58,217
9 P86 马兰 (MARAN) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈慕达利 15,868 62.01 (回教党) 纳斯鲁丁 9,227 6,641 495 78.95 32,517
10 P87 瓜拉吉挠 (KUALA KRAU) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈莫哈末赛 16,165 58.69 (回教党) 卡马沙利 10,900 5,265 479 80.83 34,139
11 P88 淡马鲁 (TEMERLOH) (国阵巫统) 赛夫丁 21,381 51.84 (公正党) 阿末尼占 18,940 2,441 924 76.37 54,010
12 P89 文冬 (BENTONG) (国阵马华) 廖中莱 25,134 64.44 (公正党) 波罗沙美 12,585 12,549 1,285 73.01 53,651
13 P90 百乐 (BERA) (国阵巫统) 依斯迈沙比利 18,051 54.59 (回教党) 马兹兰阿利曼 14,230 3,821 783 76.91 42,993
14 P91 云冰 (ROMPIN) (国阵巫统) 贾马鲁丁 21,308 65.04 (回教党) 马兹兰耶欣 10,629 10,679 824 79.04 41,701
雪兰莪：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P92 沙白安南 (SABAK BERNAM) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼 12,055 51.33 (公正党) 峇鲁阿敏 10,720 1,335 711 75.00 31,381
2 P93 大港 (SUNGAI BESAR) (国阵巫统) 诺丽雅 16,069 57.83 (回教党) 奥斯曼沙布朗 11,060 5,009 656 81.69 34,073
3 P94 乌鲁雪兰莪 (ULU SELANGOR) (公正党) 再纳阿比丁 23,177 48.67 (国阵国大党) G.巴拉尼威 22,979 198 1,466 74.89 63,593
4 P95 丹绒加弄 (TANJONG KARANG) (国阵巫统) 诺奥玛 16,073 55.42 (回教党) 莫哈末哈尼巴 12,253 3,820 674 79.83 36,391
5 P96 瓜拉雪兰莪 (KUALA SELANGOR) (回教党) 祖基菲里阿末 18,796 49.96 (国阵巫统) 阿兹再也 17,934 862 894 79.81 47,203
6 P97 士拉央 (SELAYANG) (公正党) 梁自坚 30,701 50.60 (国阵马华) 李丽友 27,134 3,567 1,506 76.57 79,557
7 P98 鹅嘜 (GOMBAK) (公正党) 阿兹敏阿里 40,334 54.05 (国阵巫统) 赛安华 33,467 6,867 820 76.26 99,153
8 P99 安邦 (AMPANG) (公正党) 祖莱达 26,995 52.98 (国阵巫统) 阿兹曼 23,319 3,676 636 73.70 69,132
9 P100 班登 (PANDAN) (国阵马华) 翁诗杰 25,236 52.24 (公正党) 赛沙希尔 22,275 2,961 798 74.90 64,497
10 P101 乌鲁冷岳 (HULU LANGAT) (回教党) 茦罗斯利 36,124 50.24 (国阵巫统) 马基曼 34,379 1,745 1,401 80.02 90,319
11 P102 沙登 (SERDANG) (行动党) 张念群 47,444 62.48 (国阵马华) 何啟利 26,419 21,025 2,072 80.35 94,877
12 P103 蒲种 (PUCHONG) (行动党) 哥宾星 35,079 60.77 (国阵民政党) 卢永平 22,486 12,593 158 78.44 75,625
13 P104 格拉那再也 (KELANA JAYA) (公正党) 罗国本 30,298 51.77 (国阵马华) 李华民 25,267 5,031 1,065 73.61 79,649
14 P105 八打灵再也南区 (PJ SELATAN) (公正党) 许来贤 28,598 54.44 (国阵马华) 林祥才 22,892 5,706 1,044 71.91 73,192
15 P106 八打灵再也北区 (PJ UTARA) (行动党) 潘俭伟 37,851 67.28 (国阵马华) 周美芬 17,879 19,972 527 73.47 76,618
16 P107 梳邦 (SUBANG) (公正党) 西华拉沙 35,024 53.54 (国阵国大党) 慕鲁根山 28,315 6,709 2,079 78.02 84,414
17 P108 沙亚南 (SHAH ALAM) (回教党) 卡利阿都沙末 33,356 57.36 (国阵巫统) 阿都阿兹三苏汀 24,042 9,314 749 77.47 75,334
18 P109 加埔 (KAPAR) (公正党) 马尼卡瓦沙甘 48,196 55.30 (国阵国大党) 柯玛拉 35,899 12,297 3,064 78.10 112,224
19 P110 巴生 (KLANG) (行动党) 查尔斯圣地亚哥 37,990 64.05 (国阵马华) 庄祷融 20,289 17,701 1,036 76.23 77,816
20 P111 哥打拉惹 (KOTA RAJA) (回教党) 希蒂玛丽亚 38,630 67.39 (国阵国大党) 威尼斯瓦兰 17,879 20,751 814 79.74 71,887
21 P112 瓜拉冷岳 (KUALA LANGAT) (公正党) 阿都拉沙尼 26,687 50.55 (国阵巫统) 哈芝苏莱曼 25,698 989 407 79.37 66,515
22 P113 雪邦 (SEPANG) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末欣 26,381 53.83 (回教党) 莫哈末玛奇 21,532 4,849 1,099 79.20 62,044
吉隆坡联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P114 甲洞 (KEPONG) (行动党) 陈胜尧 35,552 74.90 (国阵民政党) 刘开强 11,704 23,848 212 78.10 60,775
2 P115 峇都 (BATU) (公正党) 蔡添强 29,785 58.71 (国阵民政党) 林时彬 20,330 9,455 614 72.72 70,544
3 P116 旺沙马朱 (WANGSA MAJU) (公正党) 黄朱强 19,637 49.74 (国阵马华) 姚长禄 19,487 150 357 73.01 54,509
4 P117 泗岩沫 (SEGAMBUT) (行动党) 林立迎 25,046 58.38 (国阵民政党) 马伟祺 17,314 7,732 541 72.93 59,690
5 P118 斯迪亚旺沙 (SETIAWANGSA) (国阵巫统) 朱哈斯南 25,489 58.24 (公正党) 依布拉欣 17,355 8,134 918 76.56 57,161
6 P119 帝帝皇沙 (TITIWANGSA) (回教党) 洛洛莫哈末卡扎里 17,857 52.62 (国阵巫统) 阿兹加马鲁丁 15,885 1,972 191 68.01 49,892
7 P120 武吉免登 (BUKIT BINTANG) (行动党) 方贵伦 26,811 67.35 (国阵马华) 李崇孟 12,534 14,277 466 66.37 59,986
8 P121 班底谷 (LEMBAH PANTAI) (公正党) 努鲁依莎 21,728 52.62 (国阵巫统) 莎丽扎 18,833 2,895 239 72.88 56,650
9 P122 士布爹 (SEPUTEH) (行动党) 郭素沁 47,230 81.23 (国阵马华) 周紫琳 10,738 36,492 174 75.70 76,891
10 P123 蕉赖 (CHERAS) (行动党) 陈国伟 39,253 77.81 (国阵马华) 吴心一 10,953 28,300 244 73.58 68,725
11 P124 敦拉萨镇 (BANDAR TUN RAZAK) (公正党) 卡立依布拉欣 28,123 51.66 (国阵马华) 陈财和 25,608 2,515 707 75.72 72,628
布城联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P125 布城 (PUTRAJAYA) (国阵巫统) 东姑安南 4,038 75.06 (回教党) 莫哈末诺 1,304 2,734 38 81.96 6,608
森美兰：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P126 日叻务 (JELEBU) (国阵巫统) 莱士雅丁 19,737 68.93 (回教党) 诺曼依彬 8,127 11,610 769 75.05 38,682
2 P127 仁保 (JEMPOL) (国阵巫统) 利拉耶辛 25,294 64.33 (回教党) 茜蒂玛丽亚 12,974 12,320 1,054 73.53 53,478
3 P128 芙蓉 (SEREMBAN) (行动党) 约翰费南迪 32,970 51.32 (国阵马华) 尤绰韜 29,022 3,948 2,248 76.10 84,675
4 P129 瓜拉庇劳 (KUALA PILAH) (国阵巫统) 哈山马力 20,417 64.34 (公正党) 安华莫哈末沙烈 10,409 10,008 908 74.79 42,328
5 P130 亚沙 (RASAH) (行动党) 陆兆福 34,271 60.49 (国阵马华) 姚再添 21,120 13,151 1,261 78.56 72,115
6 P131 林茂 (REMBAU) (国阵巫统) 凯里 26,525 54.82 (公正党) 巴都鲁希山 20,779 5,746 1,086 77.75 62,896
7 P132 直落甘望 (TELOK KEMANG) (公正党) 卡玛鲁巴哈林 23,348 50.99 (国阵国大党) 索迪纳登 20,544 2,804 1,299 77.45 60,186
8 P133 淡边 (TAMPIN) (国阵巫统) 沙兹曼 24,022 66.58 (回教党) 拉查吉 10,943 13,079 1,115 76.24 47,655
马六甲：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P134 马日丹那 (MASJID TANAH) (国阵巫统) 阿布瑟曼尤索夫 21,582 68.31 (回教党) 阿都甘尼 9,297 12,285 717 78.10 40,606
2 P135 亚罗牙也 (ALOR GAJAH) (国阵马华) 冯镇安 26,354 63.08 (行动党) 陈丽香 13,470 12,884 1,953 77.37 54,097
3 P136 冬牙峇株 (TANGGA BATU) (国阵巫统) 伊德利斯哈仑 30,460 61.32 (公正党) 再农嘉化 15,960 14,500 3,255 82.53 60,188
4 P137 武吉卡迪 (BUKIT KATIL) (国阵巫统) 末西蜡阿布 30,975 50.48 (公正党) 卡立耶化 29,217 1,758 1,173 81.92 75,777
5 P138 马六甲市区 (KOTA MELAKA) (行动党) 沉同钦 38,640 57.38 (国阵马华) 王乃志 27,250 11,390 1,448 79.57 84,805
6 P139 野新 (JASIN) (国阵巫统) 阿末韩查 27,838 63.02 (公正党) 祖吉菲礼 15,348 12,490 990 78.72 56,121
柔佛：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P140 昔加末 (SEGAMAT) (国阵国大党) 苏巴马廉 15,921 53.61 (行动党) 彭学良 12,930 2,991 847 72.96 40,708
2 P141 士基央 (SEKIJANG) (国阵巫统) 巴哈仑 17,979 67.30 (公正党) 祖基菲沙烈 8,112 9,867 622 76.03 35,138
3 P142 拉美士 (LABIS) (国阵马华) 蔡智勇 13,658 56.82 (行动党) 张颖群 9,564 4,094 816 71.95 33,468
4 P143 巴莪 (PAGOH) (国阵巫统) 慕尤丁 21,028 69.49 (回教党) 莫哈末罗查礼 8,447 12,581 787 75.70 40,042
5 P144 礼让 (LEDANG) (国阵巫统) 哈敏 25,319 56.96 (公正党) 刘德海 17,702 7,617 1,433 75.99 58,501
6 P145 峇吉里 (BAKRI) (行动党) 余德华 21,051 49.02 (国阵马华) 郑贝川 20,329 722 1,561 76.55 56,372
7 P146 麻坡 (MUAR) (国阵巫统) 拉查里 16,986 56.22 (公正党) 娜布汀 12,325 4,661 902 73.81 41,019
8 P147 巴力士隆 (PARIT SULONG) (国阵巫统) 诺莱妮 26,066 65.88 (回教党) 费沙阿里 12,467 13,599 1,033 78.91 50,234
9 P148 亚依淡 (AYER HITAM) (国阵马华) 魏家祥 20,230 73.68 (回教党) 胡申苏嘉 6,321 13,909 907 78.98 34,805
10 P149 四加亭 (SRI GADING) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末阿兹士 19,641 67.39 (公正党) 阿里玛贡 8,767 10,874 738 79.43 36,845
11 P150 峇株巴辖 (BATU PAHAT) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末卜艾 32,461 60.13 (公正党) 莫哈末阿都拉 19,757 12,704 1,768 77.21 70,069
12 P151 新邦令金 (SIMPANG RENGGAM) (国阵民政党) 梁德明 16,450 63.34 (回教党) 阿丹贡邦 8,597 7,853 924 74.58 34,859
13 P152 居鑾 (KLUANG) (国阵马华) 何国忠 27,970 51.76 (行动党) 黄南华 24,189 3,781 1,884 76.60 71,233
14 P153 森波浪 (SEMBRONG) (国阵巫统) 希山慕丁 17,988 71.54 (公正党) 李尚 6,418 11,570 739 75.98 33,181
15 P154 丰盛港 (MERSING) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉迪夫 20,116 73.54 (回教党) 沙哈尔阿都拉 6,380 13,736 857 75.59 36,445
16 P155 东南镇 (TENGGARA) (国阵巫统) 哈丽玛 19,031 75.08 (回教党) 沙烈法敏 4,982 14,049 1,336 78.49 32,297
17 P156 哥打丁宜 (KOTA TINGGI) (国阵巫统) 赛哈密 22,682 83.83 (回教党) 翁嘉化 3,721 18,961 653 79.29 34,190
18 P157 边佳兰 (PENGERANG) (国阵巫统) 阿莎丽娜 不战而胜 33,002
19 P158 地不佬 (TEBRAU) (国阵马华) 邓文村 30,860 63.51 (回教党) 罗斯来尼 16,202 14,658 1,525 77.73 62,505
20 P159 巴西古当 (PASIR GUDANG) (国阵巫统) 莫哈末卡立 35,849 64.44 (公正党) 末尼占莫哈末沙曼 18,568 17,281 1,211 76.71 72,862
21 P160 新山 (JOHOR BAHRU) (国阵巫统) 沙里尔 43,143 69.22 (人民党) 哈山卡林 17,794 25,349 1,391 69.59 89,725
22 P161 埔来 (PULAI) (国阵巫统) 诺加兹兰 38,036 67.08 (回教党) 阿都拉 17,587 20,449 1,079 71.42 79,622
23 P162 振林山 (GELANG PATAH) (国阵马华) 曾亚英 33,630 55.45 (公正党) 查丽哈 24,779 8,851 2,244 77.19 78,676
24 P163 古来 (KULAI) (国阵马华) 黄家定 32,017 59.71 (行动党) 吴柏松 20,273 11,744 1,327 79.69 67,358
25 P164 笨珍 (PONTIAN) (国阵巫统) 阿末玛士兰 23,121 70.48 (公正党) 莫哈末安努亚 8,677 14,444 1,008 75.83 43,264
26 P165 丹绒比艾 (TANJONG PIAI) (国阵马华) 黄日升 23,302 65.92 (行动党) 阿末顿 10,931 12,371 1,117 77.35 45,701
纳闽联邦直辖区：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P166 纳闽 (LABUAN) (国阵巫统) 尤索夫玛哈 10,471 75.32 (独立人士) 刘成吉 2,014 8,457 311 68.08 20,783
沙巴：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P167 古达 (KUDAT) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉欣巴克里 17,634 66.72 (公正党) 耶也奥曼 7,739 9,895 1,058 66.98 39,643
2 P168 马鲁都 (KOTA MARUDU) (国阵团结党) 麦西慕 12,028 54.25 (公正党) 安东尼曼帝奥 7,830 4,198 748 69.51 31,938
3 P169 哥打毛律 (KOTA BELUD) (国阵巫统) 阿都拉曼达兰 17,842 52.93 (公正党) 沙依帝西莫依 14,822 3,020 1,046 78.27 43,071
4 P170 斗亚兰 (TUARAN) (国阵民统) 威弗烈邦布琳 17,645 57.80 (公正党) 安沙里阿都拉 11,023 6,622 979 74.89 40,761
5 P171 昔邦加 (SEPANGGAR) (国阵沙进步党) 依力马贞文 16,884 62.99 (公正党) 莫哈末依巴拉欣 5,423 11,461 790 68.76 39,251
6 P172 亚庇 (KOTA KINABALU) (行动党) 邱庆洲 9,464 33.89 (公正党) 刘静芝 9,358 106 340 64.09 43,714
7 P173 布达丹 (PUTATAN) (国阵民统) 马京马古斯莫吉高 13,737 60.90 (公正党) 少吉那尤索夫 7,292 6,445 608 66.68 34,935
8 P174 兵南邦 (PENAMPANG) (国阵民统) 柏纳东博 13,400 52.80 (公正党) 爱尔文波西 10,337 3,063 540 70.84 35,821
9 P175 吧巴 (PAPAR) (国阵巫统) 罗丝娜拉西 15,352 62.72 (公正党) 瓦合依德利斯 5,778 9,574 651 75.84 32,276
10 P176 金马利 (KIMANIS) (国阵巫统) 阿尼法阿曼 10,242 59.03 (独立人士) 查阿法依斯迈 4,789 5,453 500 78.09 22,239
11 P177 保佛 (BEAUFORT) (国阵巫统) 拉京奥津 14,780 76.47 (公正党) 拉津尤索夫 3,866 10,914 681 72.22 26,788
12 P178 实必丹 (SIPITANG) (国阵巫统) 沙巴威阿末 11,905 65.43 (公正党) 卡林达欣 5,759 6,146 531 75.00 24,145
13 P179 兰瑙 (RANAU) (国阵民统) 系林安古巴 14,074 63.49 (公正党) 佐纳丹耶辛 6,823 7,251 653 72.06 30,810
14 P180 根地咬 (KENINGAU) (国阵团结党) 拜林吉丁岸 14,958 56.84 (公正党) 杰菲里吉丁岸 10,334 4,624 464 73.97 35,578
15 P181 丹南 (TENOM) (国阵巫统) 莱米翁吉 9,535 60.76 (公正党) 安德利斯达利宾 2,652 6,883 523 75.20 20,874
16 P182 冰厢岸 (PENSIANGAN) (国阵人民团结) 佐瑟古律 不战而胜 19,712
17 P183 柏鲁兰 (BELURAN) (国阵巫统) 罗纳建迪 7,090 57.58 (独立人士) 兰沙达欣 2,738 4,352 468 64.00 19,181
18 P184 里巴兰 (LIBARAN) (国阵巫统) 朱斯里阿基罗 13,668 66.93 (公正党) 阿末丹林再尼 6,139 7,529 613 65.33 31,435
19 P185 巴都沙比 (BATU SAPI) (国阵团结党) 蒋国华 9,479 59.32 (独立人士) 钟广维 5,771 3,708 730 63.06 26,004
20 P186 山打根 (SANDAKAN) (国阵自民党) 刘伟强 8,297 41.50 (行动党) 章翠玲 8,121 176 644 61.00 32,847
21 P187 京那巴丹岸 (KINABATANGAN) (国阵巫统) 邦莫达拉丁 8,507 66.50 (公正党) 阿末阿都 2,181 6,326 589 66.00 19,554
22 P188 诗南 (SILAM) (国阵巫统) 沙礼卡比 18,111 66.05 (公正党) 哈斯布拉奥亨 8,319 9,792 989 63.37 43,488
23 P189 仙本那 (SEMPORNA) (国阵巫统) 沙菲益阿达 19,419 87.44 (公正党) 阿基斯阿都哈密 1,957 17,462 832 63.07 35,216
24 P190 斗湖 (TAWAU) (国阵沙进步党) 蔡顺梅 13,943 51.58 (行动党) 陈泓縑 9,076 4,867 735 63.52 42,560
25 P191 加拉巴干 (KALABAKAN) (国阵巫统) 阿都嘉夫 不战而胜 36,018
砂拉越：
No 选区 中选者 得票 得票率(%) 对手 对手得票 多数票 废票 投票率(%) 选民人数
1 P192 玛士加汀 (MAS GADING) (国阵民进党) 迪奇拉菲 8,551 57.89 (国民党) 巴岛鲁必士 4,250 4,301 188 67.37 21,968
2 P193 山都望 (SANTUBONG) (国阵土保党) 旺朱乃迪 15,800 79.39 (公正党) 拉末艾迪尔 3,855 11,945 248 64.73 30,836
3 P194 柏特拉再也 (PETRA JAYA) (国阵土保党) 法迪拉 19,515 78.39 (公正党) 莫哈末佐希 5,118 14,397 263 61.74 40,533
4 P195 古晋 (BANDAR KUCHING) (行动党) 张健仁 22,901 63.45 (国阵人联党) 沉耀荣 12,949 9,952 242 68.13 53,216
5 P196 实旦宾 (STAMPIN) (国阵人联党) 杨昆贤 21,966 50.51 (行动党) 温利山 18,896 3,070 428 65.31 67,257
6 P197 哥打三马拉汉 (KOTA SAMARAHAN) (国阵土保党) 苏莱曼泰益 15,559 72.61 (公正党) 胡先阿波 4,148 11,411 823 75.14 28,517
7 P198 曼旺 (MAMBONG) (国阵土保党) 詹姆士达弗 14,182 63.94 (公正党) 玛仁邦约 7,525 6,657 473 61.71 36,147
8 P199 西连 (SERIAN) (国阵人联党) 里察烈 15,793 85.41 (国民党) 柏拉勇阿纳查央 2,366 13,427 332 66.36 27,901
9 P200 峇丹砂隆 (BATANG SADONG) (国阵土保党) 南茜苏克利 8,183 73.65 (公正党) 毕依琳 2,758 5,425 170 66.21 16,794
10 P201 峇丹鲁巴 (BATANG LUPAR) (国阵土保党) 罗哈妮 11,015 76.59 (回教党) 阿邦依迪 2,923 8,092 193 64.21 22,417
11 P202 斯里阿曼 (SRI AMAN) (国阵砂人民党) 玛瑟古札 9,700 63.16 (独立人士) 古波阿纳鲁西 5,448 4,252 211 59.70 25,724
12 P203 鲁勃安都 (LUBOK ANTU) (国阵砂人民党) 威廉雅劳 6,769 56.28 (独立人士) 尼克拉斯巴威尔 5,159 1,610 99 69.97 17,190
13 P204 木中 (BETONG) (国阵土保党) 道格拉斯 13,708 85.93 (国民党) 史登里朱戈 1,999 11,709 246 72.22 22,088
14 P205 砂拉卓 (SARATOK) (国阵民进党) 惹拉因末萨 12,470 75.80 (公正党) 莫哈末耶也 3,764 8,706 218 68.66 23,982
15 P206 丹绒玛尼斯 (TANJONGＭANIS) (国阵土保党) 诺拉阿都拉曼 不战而胜 17,052
16 P207 伊干 (IGAN) (国阵土保党) 瓦合杜拉 不战而胜 15,735
17 P208 泗里街 (SARIKEI) (国阵人联党) 陈冠勋 10,588 47.98 (行动党) 黄华西 10,537 51 176 69.68 31,675
18 P209 如楼 (JULAU) (国阵砂人民党) 佐瑟沙朗 10,351 77.83 (公正党) 安布鲁斯拉邦 2,767 7,584 182 65.50 20,306
19 P210 加拿逸 (KANOWIT) (国阵砂人民党) 艾伦达干 不战而胜 17,613
20 P211 南兰 (LANANG) (国阵人联党) 张泰卿 19,476 56.71 (行动党) 黄培根 14,612 4,864 253 69.54 49,530
21 P212 诗巫 (SIBU) (国阵人联党) 刘会洲 19,138 52.61 (行动党) 黄和联 15,903 3,235 526 67.77 53,679
22 P213 沐胶 (MUKAH) (国阵土保党) 廖迈克 10,090 70.05 (独立人士) 海宾玛拉威因 3,792 6,298 521 63.17 22,851
23 P214 实兰沟 (SELANGAU) (国阵砂人民党) 佐瑟恩都鲁 不战而胜 20,057
24 P215 加帛 (KAPIT) (国阵土保党) 阿歷山大南达林奇 不战而胜 22,723
25 P216 乌鲁拉让 (HULU RAJANG) (国阵砂人民党) 比利阿必佐 6,590 59.08 (独立人士) 乔治拉贡 4,426 2,164 139 63.09 17,696
26 P217 民都鲁 (BINTULU) (国阵民进党) 张庆信 23,628 72.53 (行动党) 林素均 8,663 14,965 288 64.98 50,404
27 P218 实务地 (SIBUTI) (国阵土保党) 阿末莱 8,238 63.27 (公正党) 张有庆 4,590 3,648 192 58.84 22,143
28 P219 美里 (MIRI) (国阵人联党) 陈华贵 19,354 57.32 (行动党) 房保德 14,138 5,216 273 60.70 55,963
29 P220 峇南 (BARAM) (国阵民进党) 耶谷沙岸 7,996 66.00 (独立人士) 哥宾旺 3,952 4,044 167 49.65 24,425
30 P221 林梦 (LIMBANG) (国阵土保党) 哈斯比哈比波拉 6,427 52.29 (公正党) 刘烈贵 5,751 676 113 60.94 20,315
31 P222 老越 (LAWAS) (国阵土保党) 亨利宋艾贡 8,526 91.27 (公正党) 查巴苏友 734 7,792 82 59.44 15,717
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